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BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUDGES: THE 
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MAGISTRATE JUDGE BENCH 
JENNIFER L. THURSTON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal judicial system is made up of two types of judges: those created 
by Article III of the United States Constitution1 and those created through the 
power of Congress under Article I.2 The demographic makeup of these bodies is 
curious. For decades—indeed, for nearly the first 200 years of its existence—the 
federal bench was made up of white3 men. During this same time, efforts by 
women and those of diverse racial backgrounds to enter the judiciary and the 
legal profession were largely thwarted. 
In an early effort in 1872, the United States Supreme Court4 refused to 
overturn a decision of a lower court that found women could not be admitted to 
the Bar.5 The concurring opinion noted, “The paramount destiny and mission of 
woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the 
law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general 
constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.”6 
Nevertheless, seventy-five years later in 1949, President Harry S. Truman 
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 1.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
 2.  Congress was granted the power “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 3.  I use the term “white” to refer to those who are non-Hispanic Caucasians and “non-white” to 
refer to everyone else. I use these words not because I believe they are properly descriptive but merely 
to match the phraseology used in the published data. I mean no offense when using these archaic 
descriptors. 
 4.  Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 5.  Id. at 139. 
 6.  Id. at 141. 
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appointed Burnita Shelton Matthews to a federal judgeship, making her the first 
female district judge in history.7 
People of color faced similar difficulties. Macon Bolling Allen is credited with 
being the first African American to receive his license to practice law in 1844.8 
Unable to secure enough clients—most whites would not hire him—he 
supplemented his income by obtaining a position as a Justice of the Peace. This 
made him the first African American judge despite that the United States 
Constitution at that time did not consider him to be a citizen of this country. It 
was not for another 100 years that, finally, in 1937, the first African American 
District Judge, William Henry Hastie9, was appointed to the bench. It was not 
until 1966 that the first African American woman, Constance Baker Motley, was 
appointed to the federal district court.10 
Over the years, women and people of color have made inroads into the 
federal judiciary, but until Jimmy Carter took office only eight women had ever 
been appointed to Article III judgeships and only six served at that time.11 By the 
end of the Carter Administration, forty women served. Carter’s approach was 
goal-oriented and effective.12 He modified the selection process away from a 
system of political patronage and toward one focused on the quality of the 
candidate.13 He made diversity a goal and developed citizen nominating 
commissions that actively recruited and encouraged women and people of color 
to apply for judgeships.14 
Though still appointing mostly white males, President Clinton was the first to 
appoint fewer than 60% white males during his time in office and the first to 
appoint more than 20% female judges.15 George W. Bush brought more Latinas 
to the bench than all of the administrations before him combined, appointing 
twelve females of Latin American descent.16 
 
 7.  Women’s History Month, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/educational-resources/annual-observances/womens-history-month [https://perma.cc/N7LC-
G9S9] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). By this time, women had been appointed to other judicial positions, 
including as a Magistrate in the U.S. Customs Court, and in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 8.  Macon Bolling Allen Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Apr. 2, 2014) 
http://www.biography.com/people/macon-bolling-allen-21342461 [https://perma.cc/2M43-77AE]. 
 9.  Interview by Jerry N. Hess with Judge William H. Hastie, Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Philadelphia, Pa. (Jan. 5, 1972), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/hastie.htm 
[https://perma.cc/98SG-AYRJ]. President Truman previously appointed him to the position of the 
Governor of the Virgin Islands. 
 10.  Motley, Constance Baker, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/motley-constance-baker 
[https://perma.cc/3RUL-MXC8] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
 11.  Mary L. Clark, Carter’s Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the Federal Bench: His 
Other “Human Rights” Record, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1131, 1132–33 (2002). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Jonathan K. Stubbs, A Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments by Sex and Race: 
1789–2016, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 92, 107–08 (2016). 
 16.  Id. at 108. 
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The Obama administration made strides toward improving the diversity of 
the federal bench. President Obama appointed the first Haitian American, the 
first Native American female and the first Afro-Caribbean district judges.17 He 
was the first to focus on the LGBT community when seeking out judicial 
candidates and appointed the first openly gay Circuit Court judge.18 Nineteen 
percent of Obama’s overall appointments were African Americans; he appointed 
more African American females than any other president in history. He 
appointed more Asian American women than all the Presidents before him 
combined.19 
President Obama’s tactic was a modified version of Carter’s initiatives. 
Though still relying upon senators to identify judicial hopefuls, he sought the 
assistance of female and minority members of Congress.20 He encouraged 
minority and women’s groups to propose judicial candidates.21 He promoted 
candidates who had the support of both major political parties and was successful 
in appointing most of those he nominated.22 He did this without sacrificing 
quality. 23 
 
 17.  Jennifer Bendery, Senate Confirms First-Ever Native American Woman as a Federal Judge, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2014, 10:07 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/15/native-
american-judge_n_5330273.html?ec_carp=4279952720454742018 [https://perma.cc/2YPF-QQD8]; 
Donna Owens, Obama’s Legacy on Judicial Appointments, by the Numbers, NBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017, 
9:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/president-obama-the-legacy/obama-s-legacy-judicial-
appointments-numbers-n709306 [https://perma.cc/P5FU-GW6S]. 
 18.  Diane Bartz, U.S. Senate Confirms First Openly Gay Federal Appeals Court Judge, REUTERS 
(Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-judge-gay/u-s-senate-confirms-first-openly-gay-
federal-appeals-court-judge-idUSBRE98N16D20130924?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews 
[https://perma.cc/CFG9-VZH5]. Judge Todd M. Hughes is a 1992 graduate of Duke Law School. 
 19.  Stubbs, supra note 15, at 108–09. 
 20.  Carl Tobias, Justifying Diversity in the Federal Judiciary, 106 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 283, 287–
88 (2012). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. In contrast, as of November 30, 2017, however, President Trump nominated only one African 
American, three Asian-American, and one biracial candidate of the 60 he has nominated. Joan Biskupic, 
Aaron Kessler & Ryan Struyk, Trump judicial picks lack decades-long diversity drive, CNN POLITICS, 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/politics/trump-judges-courts-race/index.html [https://perma.cc/2A8P-
UVRE] (last updated Nov. 30, 2017). Of these 60 candidates, less than 19% were women, down from 
nearly 42% nominated by President Obama. Id. Most of those nominated by the President have been 
white men. Id. Though more than 80% of the candidates nominated by President Trump have received 
“Well-qualified” ratings by the American Bar Association, 8% have been rated “Not qualified.” Id.  
Exactly how the ABA determines a candidate is “qualified,” is unclear.  For example, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on December 13, 2017 to consider several judicial candidates. 
Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/12/13/2017/nominations [https://perma.cc/D724-DSQZ] 
(video beginning at 1:50:57 on recording) (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). A portion of the hearing focused on 
a white, male candidate being questioned about his experience by Senator John Kennedy (R) of 
Louisiana (a former constitutional law professor at Louisiana State University). The candidate admitted 
to having never tried a bench or jury trial, never having taken a deposition on his own though he attended 
less than five as a newly minted law firm associate, never having argued a motion in court, not knowing 
what a motion in limine was, not having made a “comprehensive” review of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since law school and not knowing what the Daubert 
standard was. Despite this, the ABA gave this candidate a “qualified” rating. Standing Comm. on the 
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It has been through the will of presidential administrations that women and 
people of color have been added to the district judge bench. Still, this change has 
failed to achieve a judiciary whose demographic makeup roughly approximates 
that of the country’s population, and the diversification of the district judge bench 
has not been duplicated on the magistrate judge bench. 
From 2009 to 2016, females on the district court bench increased 13.2%, from 
19.4% to 32.6%, and non-white district judges increased 10.6%, from 16.4% to 
27.0%.24 During this same period, the number of female magistrate judges 
increased only by 7.2% and non-whites increased by a paltry 1.2%.25 “Pipeline 
issues” may account for some part of the problem when seeking to diversify the 
magistrate judge bench, but, given the success of recent Presidential 
Administrations in diversifying the district judge bench, it cannot account for all 
of it. 
Some of the problem stems from the selection process for magistrate judges. 
Applicants tend to be self-selected. Facing an all-white bench is likely to be 
discouraging to prospective non-white hopefuls. Likewise, unlike the political 
selection process for district judges, magistrate judge candidates engage in a 
multi-step merit selection process that winnows applicants down to a handful 
from which the successful candidate emerges. Differing instructions to the 
selection panels, differing priorities, and differing judicial philosophies all work 
against the selection of diverse candidates for the magistrate judge bench. 
Part II of this paper will discuss the methodology employed and the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the data examined. Part III examines whether it 
matters to the quality of justice dispensed if the magistrate judge bench is not 
made up of judicial officers of diverse demographics. Part IV examines the 
available data to reveal the relative diversity of the district court bench when 
compared to the magistrate judge bench. Part V discusses the differing selection 
processes for district and magistrate judges as a possible source for the 
differences in the diversity of these benches. Finally, Part VI will analyze the 
impediments to achieving the goal of diversity of this bench and suggest solutions. 
II 
STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The data for this paper was gathered from many sources. The federal 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts provided data detailing the 
demographic makeup of the district courts. The Federal Judicial Center provided 
information as to the demographic makeup of the district judges for each judicial 
 
Fed. Judiciary, Ratings of Article II and Article IV Judicial Nominees: 115th Congress, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Web%20rating% 
20Chart%20Trump%20115.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLT5-VG9T] (last updated Dec. 13, 
2018). 
 24.  See infra Figs. 1, 2. 
 25.  See infra Figs. 4, 5. 
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district.26 The American Bar Association, the U.S. Census Bureau, and 
mandatory bar associations throughout the country provided the demographics 
of bar membership in each state. Also, the author surveyed the chief judges from 
ninety-one of the federal judicial districts27 and conducted interviews of many of 
these judges to understand their views about judicial diversity. The author also 
surveyed the entire body of active federal magistrate judges to gather their 
demographic data and to inquire about their court’s efforts to diversify the bench. 
Finally, the author searched out members of recent merit selection panels across 
the country and surveyed them about their experiences selecting new magistrate 
judges. 
The data is flawed in many respects. First, the Administrative Office changed 
the way it reported the data over time. In some years, the reports combine full-
time and part-time magistrate judges and state their demographics collectively. 
In some years the senior district judges were included in the numbers for active 
district judges, rather than as a separate category. Moreover, the AO reports only 
broad categories of races/ethnicities without regard for those who identify with 
more than one race. Consequently, to harmonize the data, the author included 
an “other” category to account for those who describe themselves differently 
than these categories or who identify with more than one race.28 
Second, the data from the FJC did not easily compare to the data provided 
by the AO. For example, four districts, the Eastern and Western Districts of 
Oklahoma and the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri, “share” judges. 
Thus, the three who sit in the districts in Missouri and the one who sits on both 
districts in Oklahoma are reported on the statistics of both courts. In addition, 
the FJC data does not distinguish between active and senior district judges. Thus, 
the author took these disparities into account. 
On the other hand, the U.S. Census Bureau data is current to the year 2010 
and is not complete. For example, there are many government lawyers practicing 
in the federal system who may not be members of the “mandatory” bar 
associations in the state in which they practice. This flaw exists in the ABA and 
other bar association data also. Demographic data from state bar associations, 
when it exists, relies on surveys with voluntary responses. Thus, the author 
applied the data to the total membership, despite the fact that the responses may 
not be representative. Finally, data reported by mandatory bar associations often 
differed from the data reported to and by the ABA. 
Nevertheless, by using the available data, a fair picture developed as to the 
demographic breakdown of lawyers practicing in each state. Even still, though 
many states have only one federal judicial district, many states have more than 
 
 26.  The FJC does not maintain historical or current demographic data on magistrate judges. 
 27.  Because of the lack of comparative data for the districts in the Virgin Islands, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam, the survey did not take these courts into consideration. 
 28.  To best capture the efforts of courts to diversity the bench, when characterizing a person as 
white or non-white, the author considered anyone of mixed race to be non-white. 
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one. Thus, the statewide data does not provide a specific picture of the 
demographics of each judicial district. 
Also of concern, the chief judges interviewed were self-selected and some 
openly admitted to volunteering for interviews to address their own specific 
agendas—for example, to explain why more diversity could not be achieved or 
why diversity has been achieved easily. There was a consistent report on many 
topics so the information gleaned is important and informs many of the 
conclusions offered in this study. 
Also, Magistrate Judges responded inconsistently about the total number of 
active, female, and non-white magistrate judges on their courts. To resolve these 
disputes, the author studied the websites from these districts and, for the most 
part, verified the correct numbers. 
Finally, gathering a representative set of data from members of the merit 
selection panels was difficult. Many courts do not publish the names of their 
panelists and, when they do, they usually do not publish contact information. The 
author scoured the Internet to find press releases, general orders, and attorney 
websites that identified members of the panels and contact information. The data 
gathered reflects responses from eighty-five former members of panels 
representing thirty-seven districts across the federal system. 
III 
DOES IT MATTER IF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE BENCH IS NOT DIVERSE? 
When the office was created by Congress, magistrate judges were intended to 
serve an “integral and important role in the federal judicial system.”29 
Burgeoning caseloads in an era of few new judgeships placed an extraordinary 
and impossible burden on district judges. “Given the bloated dockets that district 
courts have now come to expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in today’s 
federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.”30 Writing about the 
roles of Article I judges, Justice Sotomayor said famously, “It is no exaggeration 
to say that without the distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, the work 
of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”31 
Indeed, since 1990, the number of magistrate judges has increased by more 
than sixty percent.32 Since 1999, about forty new magistrate judge positions were 
added compared to half this number for district judge positions.33 In 2015, there 
were 551 full-time magistrate judges compared to 625 district judges.34 
 
 29.  Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991). 
 30.  Id. (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
 31.  Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39 (2015). 
 32.  See infra Figs. 4, 5. 
 33.  See infra Figs. 1–4. 
 34.  See infra Figs. 1–4. 
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In 2016, magistrate judges handled 1,087,249 matters made up of felony 
preliminary proceedings,35 criminal matters,36 Class A misdemeanors and other 
petty offenses, civil matters37 (which included more than 16,000 matters handled 
on consent), prisoner cases,38 miscellaneous matters, and 566,336 “additional 
duties.”39 The increasing number of dispositive orders magistrate judges issue 
translates to an increased importance of this bench to litigants and leads to the 
conclusion that diversity must be considered for this bench just as it is for district 
judges. 
With regularity, legal commentators publish articles setting forth the 
importance of judicial diversity and the reasons proffered don’t vary much. Many 
believe diversity promotes confidence in the judiciary.40 They argue a judiciary 
made up of people of all skin colors, genders, and backgrounds instills the belief 
that the legal system is not just for those traditionally in power. In 2011, White 
House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler explained that “[t]he president wants the 
federal courts to look like America . . . He wants people who are coming to court 
to feel like it’s their court as well.”41 
Unlike courts of appeal with their three-judge panels, as trial judges 
magistrate judges sit alone. When in trial, they typically lack the luxury of 
consulting colleagues about the intricacies of the legal issues brought before 
them. They may receive legal argument from counsel, but like any other trial 
judge, to be efficient, they must rule then and there. Moreover, whether the 
judge’s demographics match those of the litigants before the court42 is a matter of 
chance.43 This begs the question whether a diverse trial bench makes a difference 
to the outcome of any case. A simplistic view is that when the judge “matches” 
 
 35.  “Felony preliminary proceedings” includes search and arrest warrants, initial appearances and 
arraignments, bail review hearings, preliminary examinations, attorney appointments, detention hearings 
and the like. 
 36.  “Criminal” matters included motions, pretrial conferences, evidentiary hearings, guilty pleas, 
probation revocation proceedings, reentry/drug court proceedings, etc. 
 37.  This included social security appeals, settlement conferences, pretrial conferences, motions, 
evidentiary hearings, etc. 
 38.  This includes habeas corpus petitions, civil rights litigation and evidentiary hearings. 
 39.  FED. JUDICIARY, TABLE S-17—MATTERS DISPOSED OF BY U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGES 
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 THROUGH 2016 (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_s17_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N4Q-
EMNQ]. 
 40.  Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?:The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of 
the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1429 (2008). 
 41.  John Schwartz, For Obama, a Record on Diversity but Delays on Judicial Confirmations, N.Y. 
TIMES, August 6, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/us/politics/07courts.html 
[https://perma.cc/7HPX-UKXU]. 
 42.  African Americans are incarcerated in this country at more than five times the rate of Caucasian 
Americans.  In 2014, 2.3 million of the 6.8 million inmates in the United States were African Americans. 
Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/KF3X-
4DJG] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). Given these figures, it is hard to know whether courts should “look 
like” the litigants or “look like America.” 
 43.  Most courts assign cases to their judges randomly. Generally, at the outset of a case, the court 
has no information about the race or gender of the litigants. 
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the litigant, the judge is better able to empathize with the factual situation at 
issue.44 What, then, is the result for the “non-matching” litigant? 
Even if the bench reflects perfectly the demographics of the community in 
which the magistrate judge sits, in truth, diversity does not assure fairness any 
more than a lack of diversity assures unfairness. The color of the judge’s skin, 
whether the judge grew up in poverty, sleeps with a person of the same gender, 
has a strong political identity, or regularly attends church, does not ensure the 
judge will rule in favor of a litigant who has a similar background. To suggest 
otherwise sorely ignores judges’ commitment to the dictates of the law. 
Though it is unlikely diversity is the “silver bullet” for justice, to suggest that 
it has no bearing on the quality of decision making is equally unlikely. For 
example, one study found that though female judges often attended lesser quality 
law schools and undergraduate schools, had less experience after law school, had 
less judicial experience, and were often younger than their male colleagues, when 
appointed to their state’s highest courts, they performed as well as men.45 Though 
they published less frequently, when they did publish, the opinions of these 
female judges were cited as frequently as those authored by men.46 Female judges 
tend to be more independent in their decision making and despite the assumption 
they perform better in certain areas, such as family law; in fact, they perform as 
well as men in all practice areas.47 This suggests that although female judicial 
applicants may not present as well on paper, their skills may be equal to or 
superior to the male applicant who has an exemplary record. 
The results of studies inquiring whether a judge’s gender or race impacts cases 
are mixed.48 One study determined that female judges tended to regard sex 
discrimination claims more favorably than male judges.49 This same study 
concluded that gender does not matter when female judges decide cases involving 
“women’s issues,” such as sexual harassment affirmative action or abortion 
litigation.50  Though female judges are more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff 
in some types of cases,51 they do not decide race discrimination cases differently 
 
 44.  Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State 
Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 134 (1997). 
 45.  Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman & Eric A. Posner, Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD., 504, 526 (2011). 
 46.  Id. at 515–16. 
 47.  Id. at 526.  
 48. Christina L. Boyd, Representation on the Courts? The Effects of Trial Judges’ Sex and Race, 69 
POL. RES. Q. 788, 789–91 (2016). Professor Boyd provides an excellent analysis of the confusion related 
to whether the gender and race of judges matters to judging. 
 49.   Choi, Gulati, Holman & Posner supra note 45, at 505 (citing  Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges 
Matter Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005)).   
 50.  Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on 
Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010). 
 51.  Peresie, supra note 49, at 1761 (An empirical analysis of 556 federal appellate cases decided in 
1999, 2000, and 2001 reveals that judges’ gender mattered to case outcomes. Though plaintiffs lost in the 
vast majority of cases, they were significantly more likely to prevail when a female judge was on the 
bench.). This study concluded that in federal court, though a female plaintiff is most likely to fail in her 
sexual discrimination case, when the matter is assigned to a female judge, her chance of success doubles. 
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than their male counterparts. Though most personal injury and civil rights cases 
settle in federal court, when these cases are assigned to a female settlement judge, 
they are even more likely to settle and to settle earlier.52 
When a federal appellate panel considering a sexual harassment case includes 
at least one female, her male colleagues on the panel are twice as likely to find 
for the plaintiff than if the panel was made up of only men.53 In sexual 
discrimination appeals the presence of the female panelist nearly triples the 
likelihood the plaintiff will prevail.54 Black judges are much more likely than 
white judges to decide in favor of the plaintiff in gender discrimination cases.55 
Other studies reveal that outcomes in cases of race discrimination, voting rights, 
school desegregation, and affirmative action, do not vary significantly when 
decided by non-white judges rather than white judges.56 In a similar study, the 
author determined that plaintiffs in race-based harassment cases were 3.3 times 
more likely to prevail when their case was decided by a black judge than a white 
judge, according to logistic regression analysis.57 
A different study concluded black appellate judges rule in favor of the party 
raising race-based affirmative action programs in about 90% of cases, and white 
judges who sit with a black colleague vote in favor of such parties in 80% of the 
cases.58  When a black Democrat judge sits on a panel with a two non-black 
Republican judges, a non-black Republican judge will vote in favor of a liberal 
outcome 86% of the time.59 
Though these studies do not demonstrate that diversity matters when 
considering fairness, the impact of diversity on outcomes emphasizes the need to 
consider it when populating the magistrate judge bench. Even when a magistrate 
judge’s demographics are different from the litigants’, just like a district judge, 
when deciding areas of novel or complicated legal issues, a magistrate judge is 
likely to be influenced by orders issued by others on the district’s bench.60 Thus, 
orders from a judge of a diverse background may impact outcomes of cases with 
which the judge has no direct contact. 
 
 52.  Christina L. Boyd, She’ll Settle It, 1 J. L. & CTS. 193, 211 (2013).  
 53.  Peresie, supra note 49, at 1778. In a similar study, different researchers came to a similar 
conclusion. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex 
on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of 
Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1133–34 (2009) (citing Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects 
of Judges’ Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996 (June 
1999) (unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with authors)).  
 56.  Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court 
Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 144 (2000). 
 57.  Chew & Kelley, supra note 55, at 1156. See also Boyd, supra note 48. 
 58.  Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 167, 179 (2012). 
 59.   Id. 
 60.  See id. (discussing district court judges). 
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In areas where discretion is vested in the trial judge, it is more likely the judge 
will rule according to a sense of what is right.61 Because these cases are much less 
likely to be reversed on appeal, this is a key opportunity for diversity to impact 
the development of the law. 
Even if diversity plays no role in case outcomes, chief judges interviewed for 
this study almost uniformly stated diversity on the magistrate judge bench lends 
credibility to the court. Regarding the importance of diverse judicial benches, one 
chief judge commented, “Justice lives as much on perception as on reality.” 
Another Chief Judge remarked criminal defendants “should see a bench that 
reflects their community” and “diversity is a message that all races and ethnicities 
are important.” Another Chief Judge valued colleagues with differing 
viewpoints, “More viewpoints support a better long-term view” for the court and 
improves court governance. One Chief Judge stated that a diverse bench 
communicates to the public, “This is our court; it is a court of the community.” 
Another remarked, “A diverse bench provides a different perspective and 
supports a public perception of fairness.” 
Seemingly, at least in the opinion of these chief judges, a bench that ignores 
this reality risks legitimacy in the eyes of those it serves. Several Chief Judges 
explained that if a criminal defendant enters the courthouse and sees a bench 
made up of those who do not look like him or her, this adds to the suspicion that 
fairness will not be forthcoming. One Chief Judge noted a Magistrate Judge is 
usually the first judge a criminal defendant will see and having a diverse bench 
lets the defendant know it won’t be “just white men passing judgment” on them. 
IV 
THE DIVERSITY OF THE FEDERAL TRIAL COURT BENCH 
A. The District Judge Bench 
Of the 601 district judges in 1999, 483 were male and 118 were female. All but 
ninety-six judges identified themselves as white. By 2016, of the 625 district 
judges in the bench, 421 were male and 204 were female, and 160 were non-white. 
Fourteen courts had at least one-third of their positions filled by non-white 
judges, and sixty-one courts had at least one district judge who was non-white. 
This represents a 10% gain in the total number who were non-white. By 2016, 
females on the bench increased from little more than 20% to more than 32%. 
Only eight courts did not have at least one female district judge and twenty-four 
courts were made up of at least 30% female district judges. 
  
 
 61.  Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the judiciary: The 
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 264 (1995). 
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Figure 1: Non-White District Judges in the Federal System by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The growth in the numbers of females on the bench since 2010 is not 
attributable to any one district—indeed many districts did not improve at all and 
some decreased in the numbers of those of diverse demographics—but overall, 
there was a steady increase of non-white and female judges. Though some 
districts (Alabama Middle, Alabama Southern, Delaware, Georgia Northern, 
Georgia Southern, Kansas, Louisiana Western, Michigan Western, Mississippi 
Southern, Nebraska, Ohio Southern, Puerto Rico, Texas Eastern, and Wyoming) 
had increases in diversity, the statistics changed only because the number of 
district judges changed. 
Other courts (Illinois Central, Iowa Northern, Tennessee Eastern, and 
Tennessee Western) became less diverse. This decrease was caused not by a loss 
of judges but by an increase in the number of white, male district judges. 
According to the available data for these states, there were not sufficient 
numbers of lawyers with diverse backgrounds practicing within the states to allow 
for the appointment of diverse judges except in Tennessee where there were 
sufficient numbers of female.62 Arkansas Eastern, California Northern, 
California Southern, Florida Middle, Florida Southern, Missouri Eastern, and 
Tennessee Middle court had changes in the ratio of females or non-whites due to 
the decrease in the number of total district judges in that court. 
 
  
 
 62.  See infra Fig 6. 
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Figure 2: Female District Judges in the Federal System by Year 
 
 
According to the Bar membership data, pipeline problems did not prevent 
diversification for some courts though vacant positions were not filled by non-
white and/or female candidates. Arkansas Western, California Eastern, Florida 
Northern, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New York Southern, New 
York Western, Oregon, and Washington Eastern had sufficient numbers of 
female bar members to add to the bench, and North Carolina Western should 
have been able to do better in adding non-white and female judges.63 
Connecticut, New York Eastern, Pennsylvania Eastern, Tennessee Middle, 
Tennessee Western, Texas Western, and Virginia Eastern all added non-white 
judges rather than adding females despite the fact that this caused the non-whites 
to be overrepresented and females remained underrepresented,64 at least 
according to the published statistics of bar membership in these states. 
Of the courts that demonstrated improvement in their diversity not caused by 
a change in the number of judges, most failed to have a representative number of 
women.65 Other courts became more diverse and, in doing so, appointed diverse 
judges despite that the percentage of female and non-white lawyers in the state 
was lower than the percentage achieved by the court.66 
 
 63.  This presupposes that all of the members of the Bar are qualified for the position and eligible 
for appointment and this is, of course, unlikely to be the case. 
 64.  See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 
16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 457 (2002). 
 65.  These courts include Alaska, Arkansas Western, California Northern, California Southern, 
Florida Middle, Florida Southern, Georgia Middle, Hawaii, Illinois Northern, Illinois Southern, Iowa 
Southern, Indiana Northern, Kentucky Eastern, Kentucky Western, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan Eastern, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York Northern, New York Western, North 
Carolina Middle, Pennsylvania Eastern, Tennessee Eastern, Washington Eastern, and Wisconsin 
Eastern. The diversity numbers for Michigan Eastern, and New Mexico were more difficult to interpret 
because, the statistics for female lawyers in the state varied and these districts compared favorably to 
some but not others. 
 66.  These courts included Alabama Northern, Arizona, Florida Southern, Illinois Southern, 
Louisiana Eastern, Louisiana Middle, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan Eastern, Minnesota, 
Mississippi Northern, Missouri Western, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania Eastern, Puerto Rico, South 
Carolina, Tennessee Middle, Utah, and Virginia Eastern. Some of these courts improved in only one 
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Figure 3: Relative Change in Diversity of the District Judge Benches by District, 
2010-2017 
 
 
B. The Magistrate Judge Bench 
1. Legal Scholarship 
Despite recognition by scholars and others of the importance of Magistrate 
Judges to the federal judicial system, Magistrate Judges are rarely studied. Of the 
few papers devoted to studying this bench, most consider the source of the 
authority of these judges,67 the iterations of the present-day Magistrate Judge 
 
area, but in the category in which they showed improvement, they achieved a higher percentage of either 
non-white or female judges that the published data suggests they could. 
 67.  E.g., David A. Bell, The Power to Award Sanctions: Does It Belong in the Hands of Magistrate 
Judges?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 433 (1998) (arguing that the Federal Magistrate Act and Rule 72 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure support the proposal that magistrate judges have jurisdiction to enter sanction 
orders); Ira P. Robbins, Magistrate Judges, Article III, and the Power to Preside Over Federal Prisoner 
Section 2255 Proceedings, 2002 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2 (2002) (arguing against referral of motions filed 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to magistrate judges for final disposition); Christopher E. Smith, From U.S. 
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system,68 and the roles these judges play in the increasingly overworked district 
judge bench.69 Only a couple consider decision-making by these judges and it 
remains unclear whether the data support that magistrate judges exercise their 
own, independent judgment or they “look over their shoulders” and decide based 
upon how they think the district judge would want the issue decided.70 Few 
consider who these judges are and the impact of their backgrounds on their 
decision-making.71 
A recent study notes the relative lack of diversity of the Article I benches.72 
The author asserts that the federal benches should reflect the country’s 
population, which is more than 50% female and about 40% people of color. 
However, the paper fails to account for the variations of these populations across 
states and districts.73 
 
Magistrates to U.S. Magistrate Judges: Developments Affecting the Federal District Courts’ Lower Tier of 
Judicial Officers, 75 JUDICATURE 210 (1992) (examining the history and authority of magistrate judges). 
 68.  E.g., Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 661, (2005) (contemplating the expansion of the role of the magistrate judge); Ruth Dapper, A 
Judge by Any Other Name: Mistitling of the United States Magistrate Judge,” 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2015) 
(examining the prevalence of titling error in legal writing as it relates to magistrate judges); Leslie G. 
Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office of United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge 
System, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 607 (2006) (reviewing the origins of the present magistrate system); Douglas 
A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less Than Indispensable”: The Expansion of Federal Magistrate 
Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845 (2016) (examining the 
expansion of magistrate authority); Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The 
Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503 (1995) 
(discussing the evolution and administration of the magistrate system); Christopher E. Smith, Judicial 
Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 163 (1992) (examining interactions between magistrate judges and the 
legislature).  
 69.  E.g., Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 64 (examining the relationship between pro se litigants 
and magistrate judges). 
 70.  E.g., Christina L. Boyd & Jacqueline M. Sievert, Unaccountable Justice? The Decision Making 
of Magistrate Judges in the Federal District Courts, 34 JUST. SYS. J. 249 (2013) (evaluating the magistrate’s 
decision making and its constraints); Christina L. Boyd, The Comparative Outputs of Magistrate Judges, 
16 NEV. L.J. 949 (2016) (examining judicial decisions by magistrate judges); Jack Knight, Mitu Gulati & 
David Levi, How Bayesian Are Judges?, 16 NEV. L.J. 1061 (2016) (analyzing the presumption that judges 
constantly update their thinking with new information). 
 71.  Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Article I Judges in an Article III World; The Career Path 
of Magistrate Judges, 16 NEV. L.J. 823 (2016) (examining the career path of magistrate judges); Marian 
Payson, Diversity in the Magistrate Judge System, FED. LAWYER, May–June 2014, at 55, 56 (analyzing 
diversity in the magistrate system). 
 72.  KATE BERRY, BUILDING A DIVERSE BENCH: SELECTING FEDERAL MAGISTRATE AND 
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES, (Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. of Law & Am. Bar Ass’n Judicial Div., 
2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Building_A_Diverse_ 
Bench_0726.pdf [https://perma.cc/K834-PS6L] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
 73.  Id. at 7. The suggestion that the pipeline should be expanded with women and people of color, 
though facially attractive, ignores the shrinking job market for new lawyers in many populous areas and 
that a student entering law school today would not be prepared to ascend to the bench for upwards of 20 
years. Focusing on those who have already met the prerequisites would yield earlier dividends. 
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2. Diversity on the Bench 
In 1999, there were 450 full-time magistrate judges. 74 Of these, 348 were men, 
102 were women and 41 were non-white. By 2016, there were 519 magistrate 
judges; 324 were men, 195 were women, and 76 were people of color. This 
represents only about a 5.5% increase in non-white judges. 
Figure 4: Non-White Magistrate Judges in the Federal System by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Women fared better in joining the magistrate judge ranks and by 2015 made 
up 37.6% of the bench. Nearly 80% of these female magistrate judges were white. 
Of the ninety-one districts studied, by 2016, thirteen courts had at least one-
third of their bench made up of non-white judges, and fifty-one courts had only 
white magistrate judges. Of these latter courts, six had at least one-quarter of 
their district judge benches filled by non-white judges and another five had at 
least 20% non-white district judges. 
Thirty-one courts had at least half of their bench made up of women, and 
another fifty-nine had at least 30% women. Of the ninety-one courts studied, 
seventy-nine had at least one female magistrate judge. Of the twelve courts that 
had no female magistrate judges, only three had no female district judges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  74.  The report issued in September 2017, which should have detailed the 2015-2016 fiscal year data, 
provides the identical data as in the September 2016 report (which described the demographic data as of 
September 2015). The data for the years 2007 through 2009 appears to have included senior district 
judges, though these judges were not included in the data for the other years. 
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Figure 5: Female Magistrate Judges in the Federal System by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. By the Numbers 
Authors frequently criticize leaders for maintaining non-diverse judicial 
benches. Invariably, they compare the benches to the state population and find 
the benches lacking. A large reason for this comparison is the sparse 
demographic data for the mandatory bar associations. Though nearly every state 
bar association commits itself to diversity in the profession, most do a poor job in 
tracking the demographics of its members. 
The membership in the various mandatory bars, at least as much as can be 
seen from the available data, presents obstacles for those attempting to select 
diverse judges. For example, California is a hugely diverse state with a non-white 
population of 62%.75 However, in 2017 the California Bar Association76 
determined that only 11% of its membership is non-white. Further complicating 
the process is that the state is made up of fifty-eight counties and four federal 
judicial districts. Due to a lack of county- and district-specific demographic data 
for lawyers, and given that it is unlikely that the state bar membership is 
uniformly diverse, the available data do not necessarily explain the extent to 
which a diverse judiciary can be selected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 75.  TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON 
STATE COURTS? (Am. Constitutional Soc’y, George, Tracey E., Yoon, Albert H., 2016), 
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/gavel-gap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VV5-
PKJY] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
 76.  These results were gratefully obtained through the courtesy of the California State Bar (on file 
with author). 
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Figure 6: Numbers of Lawyers with Diverse Backgrounds by District 
D elt a 
D J
D elt a 
D J
D elt a 
D J
 2010-17  2010-17  2010-17
2016 (Act.) 2016 (Act.) Alabama Southern 2016 (Act.)
Total 5 4 18,112 9,116 14,717 13 5 18,112 9,116 14,717 4 3 18,112 9,116 14,717
Total Non-White 1 2 1,512 582 1,163 1 2 1,512 582 1,163 0 1 1,512 582 1,163
% Non White 20% 50% 8% 6% 8% 34% 3% 8% 40% 8% 6% 8% 34% 0% 0% 33% 8% 6% 8% 34% 0%
Total Female 0 1 5,844 278 5 1 5,844 278 2 2 5,844 278
% Female 0% 25% 32% 35% 52% 0% 38% 20% 32% 35% 52% 5% 50% 67% 32% 35% 52% 17%
Alaska 2017 (Est.) Arizona 2017 (Est.) Arkansas Eastern 2017
Total 6 4 4,326 1,838 2,402 22 14 18,486 11,542 14,960 8 5 *** 4,219 6,851
Total Non-White 0 0 215 48 72 6 2 563 3,155 1 1 *** 194
% Non White 0% 0% 5% 3% 3% 38% 0% 27% 14% 5% 21% 44% 7% 13% 20% *** 5% 27% -1%
Total Female 1 2 1,108 512 4 7 6,655 2,964 2 2 *** 1,009
% Female 17% 50% 27% 28% 47% 17% 18% 50% 36% 26% 50% 12% 25% 40% *** 24% 51% 11%
Arkansas Western 2017 California Central 2017 California Eastern 2017
Total 6 3 *** 4,219 6,851 33 25 105,335 112,338 168,746 11 12 105,335 112,338 168,746
Total Non-White 0 0 *** 194 14 6 22,241 12,622 6 0 22,241 12,622
% Non White 0% 0% *** 5% 27% 0% 42% 24% 21% 11% 62% 4% 55% 0% 21% 11% 62% 22%
Total Female 1 1 *** 1,009 6 12 36,807 35,100 1 7 36,807 35,100
% Female 17% 33% *** 24% 51% 33% 18% 48% 41% 31% 50% -7% 9% 58% 41% 31% 50% 2%
California Northern 2017 California Southern 2017 Colorado 2017
Total 24 12 105,335 112,338 168,746 18 11 105,335 112,338 168,746 11 9 26,300 14,390 22,164
Total Non-White 9 4 22,241 12,622 4 0 22,241 12,622 4 2 *** 523
% Non White 38% 33% 21% 11% 62% 12% 22% 0% 21% 11% 62% -2% 36% 22% *** 4% 31% 9%
Total Female 7 8 36,807 35,100 4 4 36,807 35,100 2 3 9,793 4,078
% Female 29% 67% 41% 31% 50% -4% 22% 36% 41% 31% 50% 4% 18% 33% 37% 28% 50% -9%
Connecticut 2017 Delaware 2016 (Est.) District of Columbia 2017 (Act.)
Total 13 5 *** 14,435 21,341 5 3 *** 2,099 2,978 25 3 11,872 54,692
Total Non-White 3 0 *** 758 1 0 *** 83 655 9 1 10,938 1,902 2,461
% Non White 23% 0% *** 5% 31% 8% 20% 0% *** 4% 13% 64% 3% 36% 33% 20% 16% 5% 64% 10%
Total Female 4 3 *** 3,864 1 2 *** 665 10 2 4,708
% Female 31% 60% *** 27% 51% 0% 20% 67% *** 32% 53% 3% 40% 67% 40% 53% 6%
Florida Middle 2016 (Est.) Florida Northern 2016 (Est.) Florida Southern 2016 (Est.)
Total 27 17 86,977 45,482 77,008 8 4 86,977 45,482 77,008 27 16 86,977 45,482 77,008
Total Non-White 7 2 92,196 1,975 9,241 1 0 92,196 1,975 9,241 7 4 92,196 1,975 9,241
% Non White 26% 12% 16% 4% 12% 44% 4% 13% 0% 16% 4% 12% 44% -2% 26% 25% 16% 4% 12% 44% -3%
Total Female 8 5 33,051 12442 1 1 33,051 12442 8 5 33,051 12442
% Female 30% 29% 38% 27% 51% -1% 13% 25% 38% 27% 51% -2% 30% 31% 38% 27% 51% 9%
Georgia Middle 2016 Georgia Northern 2016 Georgia Southern 2016
Total 6 3 20,593 *** 31,672 16 9 *** 20,593 31,672 4 3 *** 20,593 31,672
Total Non-White 2 0 2,179 *** 2 2 *** 2,179 0 0 *** 2,179
% Non White 33% 0% 11% *** 46% 6% 13% 22% *** 11% 46% 11% 0% 0% *** 11% 46% 0%
Total Female 1 0 5,540 *** 3 3 *** 5,540 1 0 *** 5,540
% Female 17% 0% 27% *** 51% 17% 19% 33% *** 27% 51% 6% 25% 0% *** 27% 51% 0%
Hawaii 2016 (Est.) Idaho 2013 Illinois Central 2016
Total 7 3 3,259 3,159 4,236 3 2 *** 2,538 3,836 8 3 94,610 47,424 62,782
Total Non-White 3 0 1,101 1,548 1,144 0 0 *** 64 1 1 4,263
% Non White 43% 0% 34% 49% 27% 77% 0% 0% 0% *** 3% 17% 0% 13% 33% 9% 38% -4%
Total Female 3 0 827 906 0 1 *** 645 2 1 58,658 12,669
% Female 43% 0% 75% 29% 49% 14% 0% 50% *** 25% 50% 0% 25% 33% 62% 27% 51% 8%
Illinois Northern 2016 Illinois Southern 2016 Indiana Northern 2017 (Est.)
Total 40 12 94,610 47,424 62,782 5 3 94,610 47,424 62,782 8 4 *** 11,532 15,826
Total Non-White 10 2 4,263 1 1 4,263 1 0 *** 548 617
% Non White 25% 17% 9% 38% 5% 20% 33% 9% 38% 17% 13% 0% *** 5% 4% 20% 0%
Total Female 11 4 58,658 12,669 2 1 58,658 12,669 1 1 *** 3,045
% Female 28% 33% 62% 27% 51% 2% 40% 33% 62% 27% 51% 33% 13% 25% *** 26% 51% 0%
Indiana Southern 2017 (Est.) Iowa Northern 2016 Iowa Southern 2016
Total 6 7 *** 11,532 15,826 5 2 7,528 5,576 7,523 8 3 7,528 5,576 7,523
Total Non-White 1 0 *** 548 617 0 0 168 0 0 198 168
% Non White 17% 0% *** 5% 4% 20% 0% 0% 0% 3% 13% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 13% 0%
Total Female 3 2 *** 3,045 1 0 1235 2 2 2183 1235
% Female 50% 29% *** 26% 51% 14% 20% 0% 22% 50% 0% 14% 67% 29% 22% 50% 14%
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 D elt a D J D elt a D J D elt a D J
 2010-17  2010-17  2010-17
Kansas 2016 Kentucky Eastern 2017 Kentucky Western 2017
Total 9 5 *** 7,260 8,218 8 4 17,262 8,257 13,509 5 4 17,262 8,257 13,509
Total Non-White 2 1 *** 289 1 0 690 186 0 0 690 186
% Non White 22% 20% *** 4% 23% 0% 13% 0% 4% 2% 15% 4% 0% 0% 4% 2% 15% 0%
Total Female 2 2 *** 1593 1 1 7,164 2,021 0 0 7163.7 2,021
% Female 22% 40% *** 22% 50% 0% 13% 25% 42% 24% 51% -5% 0% 0% 42% 24% 51% -17%
Louisiana Eastern 2017 Louisiana Middle 2017 Louisiana Western 2017
Total 15 5 *** 13,798 19,307 4 2 *** 13,798 19,307 10 6 *** 13,798 19,307
Total Non-White 2 1 *** 1,184 1 0 *** 1,184 0 0 *** 1,184
% Non White 13% 20% *** 9% 41% 7% 25% 0% *** 9% 41% -15% 0% 0% *** 9% 41% 0%
Total Female 6 2 *** 3,095 1 1 *** 3,095 3 3 *** 3,095
% Female 40% 40% *** 22% 51% 21% 25% 50% *** 22% 51% 25% 30% 50% *** 22% 51% 0%
Maine 2016 Maryland 2016 Massachusetts 2017
Total 6 2 *** 2,886 3,940 17 9 *** 28,869 38,800 18 7 *** 29,470 43,442
Total Non-White 0 0 *** 47 3 1 *** 4,010 2 0 *** 1,373
% Non White 0% 0% *** 2% 6% 0% 18% 11% *** 14% 47% 10% 11% 0% *** 5% 26% 4%
Total Female 1 0 *** 755 4 2 *** 9,601 5 5 *** 9,418
% Female 17% 0% *** 26% 51% 17% 24% 22% *** 33% 52% -1% 28% 71% *** 32% 52% -1%
Michigan Eastern 2016 (Act.) Michigan Western 2016 (Act.) Minnesota 2017
Total 31 7 34,637 22,915 35,236 5 4 34,637 22,915 35,236 12 8 25,229 14,510 25,483
Total Non-White 6 2 4,121 1,840 2,784 0 0 4,121 1,840 2,784 2 2 1,658 544
% Non White 19% 29% 12% 8% 8% 24% 5% 0% 0% 12% 8% 8% 24% 0% 17% 25% 7% 4% 19% 1%
Total Female 8 4 11,495 5,926 1 2 11,495 5,926 4 3 9,312 4,065
% Female 26% 57% 33% 26% 51% 8% 20% 50% 33% 26% 51% 3% 33% 38% 37% 28% 50% 2%
Mississippi Northern 2017 (Est.) Mississippi Southern 2017 (Est.) Missouri Eastern 2017 (Est.)
Total 5 3 9,115 5,373 7,067 10 5 9,115 5,373 7,067 15 7 *** 13,466 24,787
Total Non-White 1 0 1,748 458 1,067 3 1 1,748 458 1,067 5 3 *** 782 2,528
% Non White 20% 0% 19% 9% 15% 43% 20% 30% 20% 19% 9% 15% 43% 3% 33% 43% *** 6% 10% 20% 8%
Total Female 2 1 2,697 1,278 0 1 2,697 1,278 5 5 *** 3,424
% Female 40% 33% 30% 24% 51% 23% 0% 20% 30% 24% 51% 0% 33% 71% *** 25% 51% -9%
Missouri Western 2017 (Est.) Montana 2016 Nebraska 2017
Total 13 5 *** 13,466 24,787 7 3 3,458 2,274 3,159 7 3 643 3,818 5,545
Total Non-White 2 1 *** 782 2,528 0 0 104 67 0 0 38 78
% Non White 15% 20% *** 6% 10% 20% 5% 0% 0% 3% 3% 13% 0% 0% 0% 6% 2% 20% 0%
Total Female 3 1 *** 3,424 1 0 1,556 574 1 2 229 872
% Female 23% 20% *** 25% 51% 5% 14% 0% 45% 25% 50% 14% 14% 67% 36% 23% 50% 0%
Nevada 2016 New Hampshire 2017 New Jersey 2016
Total 12 7 8,916 4,717 7,281 4 2 3,507 24 13 *** 37,110 41,168
Total Non-White 3 0 304 0 0 98 8 2 *** 3,294
% Non White 25% 0% 6% 49% 13% 0% 0% 3% 9% 0% 33% 15% *** 9% 43% 3%
Total Female 3 3 2,942 1,178 1 1 1,877 879 9 6 *** 10,181
% Female 23% 43% 33% 25% 50% 13% 25% 50% 34% 29% 51% 20% 38% 46% *** 27% 51% 12%
New Mexico 2017 (Act.) New York Eastern 2016 New York Northern 2016
Total 10 10 7,203 5,207 5,524 30 15 71,000 92,921 177,035 9 6 71,000 92,921 177,035
Total Non-White 4 1 1,157 1,547 8 2 8,073 10,666 0 0 8,073 10,666
% Non White 40% 10% 22% 28% 61% 10% 27% 13% 11% 11% 43% 6% 0% 0% 11% 11% 43% 0%
Total Female 3 4 2,213 1,617 8 7 26,270 31,230 2 1 26,270 31,230
% Female 30% 40% 31% 31% 50% 0% 27% 47% 37% 34% 51% 8% 22% 17% 37% 34% 51% 22%
New York Southern 2016 New York Western 2016 North Carolina Eastern 2017 (Act.)
Total 45 14 71,000 92,921 177,035 9 7 71,000 92,921 177,035 6 4 11,675 14,585 23,694
Total Non-White 11 2 8,073 10,666 0 0 8,073 10,666 0 0 1,583 1,168 8,473
% Non White 24% 14% 11% 11% 43% 5% 0% 0% 11% 11% 43% 0% 0% 0% 14% 8% 36% 36% 0%
Total Female 7 6 26,270 31,230 1 1 26,270 31,230 1 1 5,067 4,051
% Female 16% 43% 37% 34% 51% 7% 11% 14% 37% 34% 51% 13% 17% 25% 43% 28% 51% 0%
North Carolina Middle 2017 (Act.) Western North Carolina 2017 (Act.) North Dakota 2016
Total 6 3 11,675 14,585 23,694 6 3 11,675 14,585 23,694 3 2 *** 1,495 1,698
Total Non-White 2 0 1,583 1,168 8,473 0 0 1,583 1,168 8,473 0 0 *** 394
% Non White 33% 0% 14% 8% 36% 36% 13% 0% 0% 14% 8% 36% 36% 0% 0% 0% *** 18% 13% 0%
Total Female 2 1 5,067 4,051 0 0 5,067 4,051 0 1 *** 270
% Female 33% 33% 43% 28% 51% 13% 0% 0% 43% 28% 51% 0% 0% 50% *** 26% 49% 0%
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D elt a 
D J
D elt a 
D J
D elt a 
D J
 2010-17  2010-17  2010-17
Ohio Northern 2017 (Est.) Ohio Southern 2017 (Est.) Oklahoma Eastern 2016
Total 14 7 *** 28,813 38,623 12 7 *** 28,813 38,623 3 2 17,822 8,688 13,470
Total Non-White 2 1 *** 1,432 3,090 1 0 *** 1,432 3,090 1 0 643
% Non White 14% 14% *** 5% 8% 20% -2% 8% 0% *** 5% 8% 20% 1% 33% 0% 7% 33% 0%
Total Female 4 1 *** 6,934 2 6 *** 6,934 0 1 5,866 2,171
% Female 29% 14% *** 24% 51% -5% 17% 86% *** 24% 51% 2% 0% 50% 33% 25% 50% 0%
Oklahoma Northern 2016 Oklahoma Western 2016 Oregon 2017 (Est.)
Total 5 2 17,822 8,688 13,470 10 5 17,822 8,688 13,470 12 10 15,011 8,142 12,227
Total Non-White 0 0 643 1 1 643 2 2 9,837 297 1,162
% Non White 0% 0% 7% 33% 0% 10% 20% 7% 33% 0% 17% 20% 7% 4% 10% 23% 8%
Total Female 1 0 5,866 2,171 2 1 5,866 2,171 2 4 3,656 2,059
% Female 20% 0% 33% 25% 50% 0% 20% 20% 33% 25% 50% 0% 17% 40% 24% 25% 51% -10%
Pennsylvania Eastern 2016  Pennsylvania Middle 2016 Pennsylvania Western 2016
Total 39 10 *** 36,516 49,406 13 5 *** 36,516 49,406 12 5 *** 36,516 49,406
Total Non-White 9 1 *** 2,360 0 0 *** 2,360 1 0 *** 2,360
% Non White 23% 10% *** 6% 22% 4% 0% 0% *** 6% 22% 0% 8% 0% *** 6% 22% -5%
Total Female 7 5 *** 9,924 2 2 *** 9,924 4 4 *** 9,924
% Female 18% 50% *** 27% 51% 2% 15% 40% *** 27% 51% 0% 33% 80% *** 27% 51% 11%
Puerto Rico 2016 Rhode Island 2017 South Carolina 2016 (Act.)
Total 9 4 *** 14,183 14,293 4 2 *** 3,387 4,167 15 8 6,655 10,316
Total Non-White 9 3 *** 7,681 0 0 *** 69 2 3 511 609
% Non White 100% 75% *** 54% *** 0% 0% 0% *** 2% 25% 0% 13% 38% 8% 6% 36% -7%
Total Female 2 2 *** 4,563 1 1 *** 784 5 5 1,616
% Female 22% 50% *** 32% *** 2% 25% 50% *** 23% 52% 0% 33% 63% 32% 24% 51% 11%
South Dakota Tennessee Eastern 2017 (Act.) Tennessee Middle 2017 (Act.)
Total 7 4 *** 1,302 1,933 7 5 *** 11,779 18,461 8 3 11,779 18,461
Total Non-White 0 0 *** 39 1 0 *** 703 923 2 0 703 923
% Non White 0% 0% *** 3% 17% 0% 14% 0% *** 6% 5% 25% -1% 25% 0% 6% 5% 25% 0%
Total Female 1 2 *** 273 1 1 *** 3,228 1 2 3,228
% Female 14% 50% *** 21% 50% 0% 14% 20% *** 27% 51% 13% 13% 67% 27% 51% 0%
Tennessee Western 2017 (Act.) Texas Eastern 2017 (Est.) Texas Northern 2017 (Est.)
Total 7 4 *** 11,779 18,461 7 8 100,294 57,891 89,361 13 9 100,294 57,891 89,361
Total Non-White 1 2 *** 703 923 0 0 18,924 8,266 16,889 1 2 18,924 8,266 16,889
% Non White 14% 50% *** 6% 5% 25% -3% 0% 0% 19% 14% 19% 56% 0% 8% 22% 19% 14% 19% 56% 0%
Total Female 1 2 *** 3,228 1 4 35,037 15,686 3 2 35,037 15,686
% Female 14% 50% *** 27% 51% -3% 14% 50% 35% 27% 50% 0% 23% 22% 35% 27% 50% 0%
Texas Southern 2017 (Est.) Texas Western 2017 (Est.) Utah 2017
Total 27 15 100,294 57,891 89,361 14 13 100,294 57,891 89,361 10 5 4,084 4,854 8,204
Total Non-White 12 4 18,924 8,266 16,889 6 4 18,924 8,266 16,889 0 0 245 242
% Non White 44% 27% 19% 14% 19% 56% 13% 43% 31% 19% 14% 19% 56% 3% 0% 0% 6% 5% 21% 0%
Total Female 10 7 35,037 15,686 2 2 35,037 15,686 2 2 245 902
% Female 37% 47% 35% 27% 50% 5% 14% 15% 35% 27% 50% 0% 20% 40% 24% 19% 50% -2%
Vermont 2015 Virginia Eastern 2017 Virginia Western 2017
Total 4 1 *** 1,863 2,326 19 9 24,249 32,679 23,249 5 3 24,249 32,679 23,249
Total Non-White 0 0 *** 28 4 2 2,182 3,897 0 0 2,182 3,897
% Non White 0% 0% *** 2% 6% 0% 21% 22% 9% 12% 29% 5% 0% 0% 9% 12% 29% 0%
Total Female 1 0 *** 592 4 1 8,730 10,012 0 1 8,730 10,012
% Female 25% 0% *** 32% 51% 0% 21% 11% 36% 31% 51% 10% 0% 33% 36% 31% 51% 17%
Washington Eastern 2016 (Est.) Washington Western 2016 (Est.) West Virginia Northern 2016 (Est.)
Total 10 2 25,708 16,591 25,786 13 6 25,708 16,591 25,786 4 3 *** 3,951 4,862
Total Non-White 1 0 3,143 1,304 2,475 2 0 3,143 1,304 2,475 0 0 *** 92 875
% Non White 10% 0% 12% 8% 10% 30% 10% 15% 0% 12% 8% 10% 30% -6% 0% 0% *** 2% 18% 8% 0%
Total Female 1 1 11,959 4,766 3 2 11,959 4,766 2 0 *** 1,092
% Female 10% 50% 47% 29% 50% -4% 23% 33% 47% 29% 50% 2% 50% 0% *** 28% 51% 25%
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Criticism that the magistrate judge bench remains racially homogeneous 
despite opportunities to diversity is valid. For example, despite the low bar 
membership for non-whites in California, three of the federal districts have 
district judge benches are made up of one-third or more non-white judges. The 
fourth federal district has nearly one-quarter of its district judge bench made up 
of non-white judges. Similarly, though Colorado’s bar population is made up of 
about 96% white lawyers, the district judge bench is made up of 36% non-white 
judges. This phenomenon of equaling or exceeding bar demographics occurred 
in sixty-two77 of the ninety78 districts studied. 
Though it may be surmised that courts with a racially diverse district judge 
bench would have a racially diverse magistrate judge bench, this is not the case. 
By strictly looking at the percentage of non-white district judges, the top fifteen 
most racially diverse courts are: Puerto Rico (100%), California Eastern (60%), 
Texas Western (50%), Texas Southern (44%), Hawaii (43%), California Central 
(40%), New Mexico (40%), California Northern (38%), Colorado (36%), 
District of Columbia (36%), Georgia Middle (33%), Missouri Eastern (33%), 
North Carolina Middle (33%), Oklahoma Eastern (33%), and New Jersey 
(33%). 
Of the top fifteen most racially diverse district judge benches, six79 have only 
white magistrate judges, and four80 have at least one-third of their magistrate 
judge benches occupied by people of color. Seven of the fifteen most racially 
 
 77.  Three districts exceeded or equaled the bar demographic numbers depending upon the statistic 
considered; oddly, in these districts, the number reported to the ABA as to non-white membership 
differed from that publicly reported. 
 78.  Those districts that had fewer non-white district judges than the Bar statistics indicated included 
Alaska, Arkansas Western, Florida Northern, Georgia Southern, Idaho, Iowa Southern, Iowa Northern, 
Kentucky Western, Louisiana Western, Maine, Michigan Western, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New York Western, North Dakota, Oklahoma Northern, Pennsylvania Middle, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Texas Eastern, Utah, Vermont, Virginia Western, West Virginia Northern, Wisconsin Western, 
and Wyoming. 
 79.  California Eastern, Georgia Middle, Hawaii, North Carolina Middle, and Oklahoma Eastern 
 80.  California Northern, District of Columbia, Missouri Eastern, and Puerto Rico 
D elt a 
D J
D elt a 
D J
D elt a 
D J
 2010-17  2010-17  2010-17
West Virginia Southern 2016 (Est.) Wisconsin Eastern 2016 (Est.) Western Wisconsin 2016 (Est.)
Total 6 3 3,951 *** 4,862 5 3 15,625 10,474 15,549 3 1 15,625 10,474 15,549
Total Non-White 1 2 92 *** 875 1 1 1,042 371 1,617 0 0 1,042 371 1,617
% Non White 17% 67% 2% *** 18% 8% 0% 20% 33% 7% 4% 10% 18% 0% 0% 0% 7% 4% 10% 18% 0%
Total Female 1 0 1,092 *** 1 1 6,096 2,672 1 0 6,096 2,672
% Female 17% 0% 28% *** 51% 0% 20% 33% 39% 26% 50% 17% 33% 0% 39% 26% 50% 0%
Wyoming 2017
Total 3 4 2,935 390 1,776
Total Non-White 0 0 41
% Non White 0% 0% 3% 16% 0%
Total Female 1 1 982 349
% Female 33% 25% 33% 29% 49% 8%
State 
Pop
2017 
DJ
2017 
MJ
Most 
Recent 
Bar Data
2017 
DJ
2017 
MJ
Most 
Recent 
Bar Data
2010 
Census ABA
2010 
Census
2010 
Census ABA
State 
PopABA
State 
Pop
2017 
DJ
2017 
MJ
Most 
Recent 
Bar Data
THURSTON - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2019  10:21 AM 
No. 2 2019] BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUDGES 83 
diverse district judge benches have at least half of their magistrate judge bench 
populated by women. 
Of the top gender diverse district judge benches, six81 are also at the top of 
the list for the most gender diverse magistrate judge benches. Thirty-one of the 
ninety-one courts studied have 50% or more female magistrate judges. Oddly, of 
the courts that have no district judges of color,82 the corresponding magistrate 
judge benches83 are made up of 50% or more females. 
Of the nineteen district judge benches where women occupy at least one-third 
of the positions84, ten of the corresponding magistrate judge benches have at least 
33% of their positions occupied by people of color. 
D. Conclusion 
District judge benches that are made up of a higher percentage of people of 
color or women do not ensure that the corresponding magistrate judge bench will 
have a higher percentage of judges that are non-white or female. However, courts 
that have a district judge bench that is well-populated by women and/or non-
white judges, have at least one female magistrate even when the bench is 
primarily non-diverse. Courts with a racially diverse district judge bench do not 
uniformly have a racially diverse magistrate judge bench. In the fifteen courts in 
which the district judge bench has at least one-third non-white judges, five have 
no people of color on their corresponding magistrate judge bench. Thus, it is not 
the color of the skin or the gender of the district judges that drives diversity; it is 
the collective will of the individual courts to prioritize diversity. 
IV 
SELECTION OF FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGES 
A. Selection of District Judges 
The selection of a district judge is a political process. The senator for the 
district where the opening lies is generally entitled to select a candidate to present 
for the President’s approval and, if appropriate, nomination. Before the senator 
 
 81.  Pennsylvania Western (80%), Missouri Eastern (71%), Alabama Southern (67%), California 
Northern (67%), District of Columbia (67%), and South Carolina (63%) 
 82.  Alabama Southern, Alaska, Arkansas Western, Georgia Southern, Idaho, Iowa Northern, Iowa 
Southern, Kentucky Western, Louisiana Western, Maine, Michigan Western, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New York Northern, New York Western, North Carolina Eastern, North Carolina Western, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma Northern, Pennsylvania Middle, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas Eastern, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia Western, West Virginia Northern, Wisconsin Western, and Wyoming 
 83.  Alabama Southern (67%), Iowa Southern (67%), Nebraska (67%), Alaska (50%), Idaho 
(50%,) Louisiana Western (50%), Michigan Western (50%), New Hampshire (50%), North Dakota 
(50%), Rhode Island (50%), South Dakota (50%), and Texas Eastern (50%) 
 84.  Alabama Southern (50%), Indiana Southern (50%), West Virginia Northern (50%), Hawaii 
(43%), District of Columbia (40%), Illinois Southern (40%), Louisiana Eastern (40%), Mississippi 
Northern (38%), Alabama Northern (38%), New Jersey (38%), Texas Southern (37%), California 
Northern (33%), Minnesota (33%), Missouri Eastern (33%), North Carolina Middle (33%), 
Pennsylvania Western (33%), South Carolina (33%), Wisconsin Western (33%), and Wyoming (33%). 
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begins the selection process, the President makes his wishes known about the 
type of person he would like to nominate.85 This can include information about 
judicial philosophy, demographic characteristics, and political party. It is 
uncommon for a senator to nominate a person of a political party that is contrary 
to that of the President’s, even when the President’s political party is different 
from the senator’s. Frequently, the senator’s staff members contact potential 
candidates with the right mix of experience, demographics, and political savvy, to 
encourage application. 
Most senators maintain a Judicial Advisory Committee made up of lawyers, 
laypersons of political heft, law professors, and others with an interest in the 
judiciary. This committee, made up of up to ten or more members, culls through 
the applicants’ materials and proposes the top candidates for the senator’s 
consideration. The exact process varies from senator to senator and is generally 
a well-kept secret. Unless you have been through it or know someone who has, 
exactly what happens and how it happens is a mystery. 
  
 
 85.  In 2008, the Los Angeles Times published a story detailing the agreement between the California 
senators and the Bush Administration, in which Senators Feinstein and Boxer agreed to recommend no 
candidates from the extreme right or left.  Rather, candidates would fall “between the 45 yard lines,” 
meaning they would have relatively centrist views. Henry Weinstein, Process of Judge Selection Set Up, 
L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/30/local/me-4193 [https://perma.cc/ 
4AP3-T5S7]. Likewise, in 2013, President Obama made clear his desire to appoint “firsts.” Philip Rucker, 
Obama pushing to diversify federal judiciary amid GOP delays, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2014, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-pushing-to-diversify-federal-judiciary-amid-gop-
delays/2013/03/03/16f7d2067aab11e29a75dab0201670da_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9a6f388
b7cca [https://perma.cc/NH47-U9B5]. At that time, President Obama had nominated the first openly gay 
black man to the district court. Id. Before that, he had nominated the first lesbian Asian American 
candidate for a district judge position. Id. In addition, he proposed the first South Asian to the D.C. 
Circuit. Id. Thus, it was apparent that he favored candidates from underrepresented groups. The Post 
author quoted White House Counsel, Kathryn Ruemmler when she said, “Diversity in and of itself is a 
thing that is strengthening the judicial system. It enhances the bench and the performance of the bench 
and the quality of the discussion.” Id.  
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Figure 7: The Selection Process for District Judge 
 
The selection process includes reference checking and other investigation by 
the Committee. It is common for one or more members of the Committee to 
contact judicial officers of the district to ferret out opinions about the candidates. 
A candidate who is not well-liked by the judicial officers is unlikely to do well in 
the process. However, this process does not promote cronyism because feelings 
of the court notwithstanding, the senator is obligated to propose a candidate the 
President will endorse. A candidate with political influence, regardless of 
whether he is known to or liked by the court, may succeed. 
The Committee must craft its investigation toward selecting candidates who 
meet the senator’s and President’s preferred qualities. It has broad authority to 
identify the top candidates with these qualities and, though legal skill is a key 
factor, the most brilliant legal mind may not always succeed. Often the 
Committee selects three top candidates and ranks them. Regardless of the 
ranking, the senator selects the preferred candidate. It is common for candidates 
to benefit from political pressure being brought to bear and it can make the 
difference as to the one appointed ultimately. 
Once the senator makes the selection, the candidate is forwarded to White 
House Counsel. A member of the Department of Justice is assigned, in part to 
assist and in part to vet, the candidate. A portion of this process includes 
completing the “United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees.” This requires the candidate to submit a 
huge volume of detailed information related to legal experience, finances, 
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sources of conflicts, legal writings and public speeches. The candidate must 
provide all writings issued for years before the selection and must submit to a 
medical examination. 
Assuming the responses to the questionnaire do not raise too many concerns, 
the candidate is referred to the ABA for further vetting. The ABA seeks surveys 
members about the candidate. Simultaneously, the FBI conducts an exhaustive 
background check. Also, the candidate submits to an interview with White House 
Counsel who, in general, wields the authority of the President to refuse to 
advance the candidate further. 
Assuming the candidate receives a passing recommendation from the ABA 
and there are no skeletons uncovered by the FBI, the President makes the 
nomination. After this, the Senate Judiciary Committee may schedule the 
candidate for a hearing or may require additional information. Eventually, 
however, the candidate will receive a hearing, and if favorable an “up or down” 
vote by the Senate. If the candidate receives a majority vote, the President 
formally appoints the person to the judgeship. 
B. Selection of Magistrate Judges 
The process of selecting magistrate judges differs dramatically. Rather than 
requiring an act of Congress, district judges are charged with the obligation to 
select their court’s magistrate judges. The process is intended to be merit-based 
with little leeway for political maneuvering; in practice, however, often the in-
group remains in, and the out-group remains out.  Though permitting sufficient 
flexibility for courts to select a magistrate judge who can fill the district’s needs, 
the process for selecting magistrate judges can cause significant variability in the 
effectiveness of the tools designed to ensure equal access to these positions 
regardless of the applicant’s demographic backgrounds. 
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Figure 8: The Selection Process for Magistrate Judges 
 
 
The process of obtaining approval to fill a magistrate judge position can be 
challenging depending upon the caseload statistics of the district. Once the 
district is given this authority, it is obligated to publicize it widely.86 How to meet 
this public notice requirement is largely left to the district, which can choose to 
rely on electronic notice via their web page or other, more traditional methods.87 
The Administrative Office urges districts to consider avenues that will attract 
the greatest number of qualified applicants without regard for their gender, race, 
color, age (over forty), disability, religion, or national origin.88 The AO also 
encourages the district to consider notice to minority bar associations and other 
underrepresented community groups that are likely to have members who are 
qualified for the position.89 The AO invites courts to actively encourage 
applicants from underrepresented groups.90 
 
 86.  THE SELECTION, APPOINTMENT AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 
JUDGES 13 (Judicial Services Office Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Oct. 2016) 
[hereinafter MAGISTRATE JUDGE SELECTION REPORT], http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Selection_and_Appointment_of_Magistrate_Judges_Oct-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TKS3-PQCC]. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 14. 
 90.  Id. 
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More than half of the responding chief judges reported that they comply with 
this guidance and provide the job posting to minority and specialty bar groups, 
and also made direct contact with women and minorities to encourage them to 
apply. One-third of the responding chief judges reported they target women and 
minorities when they advertise the position. About one-fourth spoke to minority 
and female lawyer groups about judicial openings, but nearly one fourth were 
unaware of any efforts to inform candidates of diverse backgrounds about the 
opening. 
About 57% of the current magistrate judges learned of the opening before 
they applied through word-of-mouth. Twenty-six percent learned of the opening 
through direct contact by a court member. Of these, 70% were white and about 
half were men. Another 25% learned of the opening through the court’s website, 
and only 8% learned of the opening through a specialty bar association 
publication. 
Part of the official job posting provides information about how to apply and 
includes a job application or a requirement that the applicant submit a curriculum 
vitae or both.91 Notably, the “sample” application form offered by the AO does 
not have space for the applicant to note demographic information, except 
obliquely when asking whether the applicant has become naturalized.92 
1. The Merit Selection Panel 
The first substantive step toward culling the applicant pool is performed by a 
merit selection panel. This panel has enormous power to determine which 
applicants to reject, which to interview and, ultimately, which candidates can be 
considered by the judges of the district.  The report the panel submits to the 
district includes its reasons for advancing the final five, but no explanation as to 
why the panel did not advance the other applicants. Consequently, the implicit 
and explicit biases of the panel members can play a determinative role in whether 
a candidate advances in the process. Despite this, panel members receive 
inconsistent instruction and training for completing their work. 
The chief district judge must appoint a merit selection panel, headed by a 
chairperson, to reduce the candidate pool to the five most qualified.93 The panel 
members must reside in or have significant ties to the district.94 Courts are 
directed to appoint a demographically diverse panel.95 
Only one panelist surveyed recalled serving on a panel that did not include a 
woman, while 56% recalled serving on a panel that had between one and five 
 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 63. 
 93.  Id. at 18, 23–24, 28–31. However, the court may choose to use the same merit selection panel to 
evaluate candidates for more than one position or the court may maintain a standing panel.   
 94.  Id. at 17. 
 95.  Id. at 18. Notably, in January 2018, Senators Kamala Harris (CA) and Cory Booker (NJ), both 
Democrats, were appointed to the Senate Judiciary Committee. They represent only the second and third 
African American ever to serve on this committee. The first was Senator Carol Moseley Braun (IL)—
also a Democrat—who served on the Committee in the 1990s.   
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female members. About 44% had between three and five female members. 
About 10% of the panelists recalled serving on a panel with no non-whites. In 
contrast, about 22% recalled one non-white member, about 15% recalled two 
non-white members, and about 16% recalled there were four non-white members 
on the panel. The panel must include at least seven members made up of at least 
five lawyers and at least two non-lawyers.96 The greatest percentage, nearly 40%, 
served on a panel that included eleven or more members. 
Though most of the panelists had served only on one panel, more than 27% 
had served on three or more panels. About 10% served on ten or more selection 
panels. More than 40% served within the prior twenty-one months, though 50% 
served between one and three years prior. About 81% had not served as a 
chairperson of a panel. 
The first meeting of the panel is informational.97 Because districts use 
magistrate judges in different ways, a judge is permitted to attend to provide 
insight into the unique court requirements of the job98 and the screening criteria.99 
However, the exact process varies from district-to-district. About half of the chief 
judges indicated they provided written materials and oral guidance only to the 
chairperson of the panel. The rest provided guidance to the entire panel and 
provided oral instruction and written materials. For one-quarter of the panels, 
the initial meeting lasted more than an hour, but most of these meetings, if they 
occurred at all, were less than one hour. For about twenty percent of the panelists, 
the oral component of the training was a mere direction to read the written 
materials. 
If the court anticipates that the position will focus on a particular area of law, 
the chief judge emphasizes this so it can be a significant concern for the panelists 
when selecting the finalists. Panelists recalled the great bulk of the training 
focused on the basic information about the job and the desired qualifications the 
successful candidate would possess. 
Though nearly 97% of the chief judges agreed it was important to select 
diverse members of the merit selection panel, about 84% reported they did not 
provide training to the panel to understand the implications of implicit bias. 
Nearly 68% did not provide instruction on the importance of diversity on the 
bench though about 78% did provided training on how to value diversity when 
evaluating applicants. 
Past merit selection panelists confirmed this. Less than 20% reported 
receiving any information about implicit bias, but nearly 80% recalled receiving 
some guidance about how to consider diversity when evaluating the candidates. 
 
 96.  Id. at 17. For the appointment of a part-time magistrate judge, the panel must include at least 
three members and may include senior, active or retired district judges, active, recalled or retired 
magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges or court staff. The panel must include two members from outside 
the court. 
 97.  Id. at 23. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
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Most panelists recalled that the focus of the initial meeting was on the expected 
qualifications of the successful candidate, basic information about the position, 
interview techniques for meeting with the applicants, and the criteria to apply 
when selecting the finalists. 
At the first meeting, the panel discusses and determines the procedures it will 
use for the selection process, for example, whether it will use secret balloting, 
whether there will be an attendance requirement, whether voting may occur in 
absentia, the rules to establish a quorum, and whether each panel member will 
have a role in the initial screening of the applicants.100 The panel must also 
establish a methodology for evaluating qualitative characteristics.101 The panel 
may conduct further investigation into the qualifications of the applicant.102 
Though panel is not obligated to interview the candidates, if it chooses to do so, 
it must establish in advance the questions to be asked to ensure a uniform 
process.103 
The panel’s objective is to select the top five individuals it determines are best 
suited to the needs of the job.104 Given the increasing regularity with which 
district judges are selected from the magistrate judge bench, the panel is charged 
with examining the applicant’s qualities as if it were selecting a district court 
judge.105 The panel is required to evaluate the applicant’s experience, including 
the areas of practice, past scholarship, professional competence, the ability to 
address complex legal issues, writing skill, reputation, and community 
involvement, including pro bono and public service work.106 The panel may 
consider the applicant’s familiarity with the district and its systems as well as its 
rules.107 The panel must select those of high moral integrity, steady temperament, 
and a demonstrated commitment to the goal of justice.108 Though there is no 
requirement to favor minority applicants, the panel is obligated “to give due 
consideration to all qualified applicants for a magistrate judge position, 
particularly those from underrepresented groups.”109 
The merit selection panel process is strictly confidential.110 The panel may 
reveal only that information necessary to fully report to the court and the panel’s 
deliberations may not be revealed.111 Much like a jury deliberation, the panel 
 
 100.  Id. at 23–24. 
 101.  Id. at 29. 
 102.  Id. at 26. Except where the application contains information gaps that impact the panel’s 
decision making, the panel is not obligated to conduct more than a cursory investigation because the 
selected candidate will undergo a full and extensive FBI and IRS background check. 
 103.  Id. at 24. 
 104.  Id. at 33. 
 105.  Id. at 28. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 29. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 31. 
 110.  Id. at 25. However, the names of the entire pool of applicants may be revealed to the judges of 
the court. 
 111.  Id. 
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discusses the candidates and members can each provide analysis.112 The panel’s 
discussion is to be robust and to fully consider the qualities of each applicant.113 
The panel must identify the top five candidates unless the quality of the applicant 
pool is such that this cannot occur.114 Rather than voting on a pool of top 
candidates, the panel is obligated to vote on each candidate individually. To make 
it to the “final five,”115 the applicant must receive a positive vote from a majority 
of the panel.116 
One Chief Judge ruminated that “horse trading” likely occurs during this 
process. “If you vote for my candidate, I’ll vote for yours.” Exactly how and 
whether this impacts the selection of diverse candidates is hard to know, but as 
the data reveals, the court and some of the panelists generally have experience 
with the candidates who move forward in the process. Notably, about 24% of the 
current sitting magistrate judges worked for the United States Attorney’s Office 
before receiving the appointment to the bench, and about 4% worked for the 
United States Federal Defender’s office. About 43% worked in a federal 
clerkship position in the past.117 
Most magistrate judges worked in private practice or in a government office 
that required practice in federal court. Only ten out of the 307 magistrate judges 
had not practiced in federal court, and one had insignificant experience. Of this 
group, five were women and six were men. One of the men is African American. 
The remaining 297 magistrate judges had substantial federal court experience. 
Within ninety days of appointment, the panel must report its five selections.118 
Seventy-eight percent reported they believed the members followed the guidance 
given by the court. In the last ten years, one-third of the courts received a group 
of finalists that included a woman more than five times; one-third received a 
group of finalists that included a woman twice. Four courts had this happen four 
times, one court had this happen three times, and four courts had this happen 
only once.119 
 
 112.  Id. at 33. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 34. If the applicant pool is insufficient, the court may make efforts toward further 
recruitment. If this occurs, the panel report is still due within 90 days from their appointment. 
 115.  If the panel is filling two positions, it must identify at least six candidates (so that five candidates 
remain once the first position is filled) or the panel may be directed to determine the top ten candidates; 
five for each position. Id.  
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Law clerks could prove to be a significant source for identifying future magistrate judge 
candidates. Sixty-nine percent of magistrate judges agreed that their courts encouraged them to hire law 
clerks that are diverse in terms of race and gender but only 29% did this explicitly. The chief judges 
agreed with this for the most part. About 53% of the chief judges reported that their courts encouraged 
hiring law clerks of diverse backgrounds though only 13% stated that this came in the form of explicit 
encouragement. 
 118.  MAGISTRATE JUDGE SELECTION REPORT, supra note 86, at 19. 
 119.  Thus, most of the merit selection panels working from 2007 through 2017, found there was at 
least one woman and at least one person of color whose qualifications placed them in the top five of those 
considered for the judicial position. On a micro level, the degree to which significance can attach to this 
data, however, depends on the number of times each of these courts filled a position during this period, 
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Over the same period, 20% did not receive a group of finalists that included 
a non-white applicant; 30% received a group of finalists that included a non-white 
candidate one time. Seventeen percent of the courts received finalists with a non-
white candidate twice, and one court had this happen three times. Ten percent of 
the courts received a list of finalists with a non-white candidate four times, and 
14% received such a list five or more times.120 
The panel’s report must provide any additional information the process has 
elicited that was not contained in the written materials provided by the 
applicants.121 The panel may choose to report on the qualities it determined to be 
most important, but it is not obligated to do so.122 The panel may choose to rank 
the finalists.123 
2. Court Selection 
Once the court receives the panel’s report, it may make the selection based 
only on the information received from the panel and the applicants, or it may 
conduct a supplemental investigation.124 The court can, and usually does, conduct 
interviews of the finalists.125 If the court determines the five top candidates are 
not acceptable, the court may request the panel provide five additional names.126 
In this event, the court must select the successful candidate from one of the two 
lists provided by the panel.127 
The active district judges and the senior district judges who carry at least a 
fifty percent caseload are entitled to vote on the final selection.128 The selected 
candidate must receive a majority vote of those entitled to vote.129 If no candidate 
wins a majority vote, the chief district judge must make the selection.130 
Chief district judges play a key role in selecting magistrate judges for their 
districts. They select, appoint, and direct the members of the merit selection 
panel—which would seem to provide them significant control over whether the 
process yields selection of diverse candidates. However, the chief judges discount 
this control and believe part of the reason the bench cannot be diversified is the 
lack of buy-in from the other district judges. On scale of one to 100, on average, 
 
but this data was not collected. Notably, in the 10 years preceding this research, of those Magistrate 
Judges responding to the survey, 198 had been appointed within the last ten years; half were women and 
half were men. Of the women appointed during this interval, 16 were non-white.  Of the 99 males 
appointed, 18 were non-white. 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  Id. at 33. 
 122.  Id. at 34. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 37. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. Some courts include the magistrate judges in the selection process, though they are not 
always allowed to vote. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
THURSTON - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2019  10:21 AM 
No. 2 2019] BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUDGES 93 
the chief judges rated the importance of having a diverse magistrate judge bench 
as seventy-nine. However, they felt that their court valued diversity of the 
magistrate judge bench only as a sixty-seven. One Chief Judge said, “You can 
talk about gender, you can talk about race, but the judges say they need to select 
the best candidate for the job and let the chips fall where they may.” In only one 
instance did a chief judge indicate the court valued diversity on the magistrate 
judge bench much more highly than the chief did.131 
Current magistrate judges had a slightly different take. Like the chief judges, 
on average, magistrate judges rated their own courts as a sixty-five on a scale of 
one to 100 when considering how highly it valued diversity of the magistrate judge 
bench. About one-fifth of magistrate judges graded their own court as a forty-
nine or below. Another one-fifth rated their courts at ninety or above. Of the 163 
magistrate judges describing their own courts as valuing diversity more than the 
average score of sixty-five, one-third were white men. 
The chief district judges felt achieving diversity of the subordinate bench was 
due, in no small part, to market forces. Seventy-five percent cited the lack of 
qualified, diverse candidates as the primary impediment to diversifying the 
bench. Fifty percent believed the need to hire the best-qualified candidate was a 
secondary impediment to achieving diversity, and one-third cited the failure of 
the merit selection panel to provide diverse candidates as a tertiary obstacle. The 
nature of the job itself was cited by several chief judges as explanation why there 
was not a more diverse candidate pool. One reported that despite the substantive 
work done by magistrate judges, some lawyers still believed the position was 
nothing more “than a glorified law clerk.” Others cited the loss of pay an 
experienced private practitioner would suffer if appointed to the position as 
explanation for the relatively shallow pool of applicants. This explains, one Chief 
Judge reported, why courts receive so many applications from government 
agencies; the salary of a magistrate judge is higher than that which government 
lawyers generally receive. However, because district judges are paid only 8% 
more than magistrate judges, this does not fully explain why people of diverse 
backgrounds will leave private practice for appointment to the district judge 
bench but won’t do so for appointment to the magistrate judge bench. 
One judge opined women are more interested in the magistrate judge bench 
because, due to family demands, they have not been on the partnership path for 
a sufficiently long time to have earned a top salary. Another thought women do 
well in the magistrate judge selection process because men—who still tend to be 
the greatest demographic on the district judge bench—are comfortable having 
 
 131.  Only considered here are those courts where the chief judge’s personal rating differed from the 
rating the chief gave the court by 20 points or more. As to several courts, where data was provided by 
both the chief judge and the members of the corresponding magistrate judge bench, the magistrate judges 
on average felt that the court as a whole valued diversity much less—meaning they rated the value the 
court placed on diversity 20 points or lower—than the chief judge. In a few instances, they felt the court 
valued diversity of their bench much higher than the chief judge. For the most part, there were 
insignificant differences between the value assessed by the chief and the average figures provided by the 
magistrate judges. 
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women as their subordinates but not as comfortable with people of color in this 
role. 
Notably, 30% of the responding chief judges reported their courts maintained 
demographic data on every applicant for magistrate judge positions and 10% 
maintained it as to the five finalists. One-third of the courts kept no data, and 
nearly 27% were uncertain whether the court kept the data. 
V 
METHODS FOR CHANGE 
Most of the chief judges interviewed expressed a commitment to diversity 
though few knew how to achieve it. A few were interested in diversity but balked 
at the idea of any “affirmative action” approach. A few advocated for a system 
of color-blindness in which the best candidate was selected regardless of that 
person’s race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. However, after studying the data and 
talking with the chief judges, areas for improvement became clear. 
The AO should maintain magistrate judge’s demographics on a district-by-
district basis rather than holding it in the aggregate. Districts should be 
encouraged to develop a culture of diversity that includes the entire court family, 
including the clerk’s office, the probation and pretrial services offices and in law 
clerk hiring in addition to the judges. Recruitment efforts should be standardized 
and targeted to ensure the wide distribution of information about open judicial 
positions. The prestige and pay for magistrate judges should be increased to 
attract candidates. Courts should gather and track demographic data on the 
judicial applicants to help to determine why more diverse applicants are not 
selected. The merit selection panels should be made up of people of diverse 
backgrounds and they should receive standardized training on key selection 
issues. Finally, courts should be held accountable for their efforts toward 
achieving diversity. 
A. Gather and Maintain Court-by-Court Data 
Despite consistent devotion of resources to the goal of diversity, the scope of 
the problem is hard to understand due to the lack of data. Though each district is 
required to report annually about the demographic makeup of their court and 
the AO reports these findings, data regarding magistrate judges is available only 
in the aggregate. This composite data provides no sure method of knowing which 
courts are doing well and which courts are struggling to achieve diversity on the 
subordinate bench. The reason for this opacity is not known, but, at least in some 
instances, it frustrates change. 
Some courts have dismal numbers in terms of diversity despite what appears 
to be a hearty pipeline of diverse bar members. It is likely these courts have no 
idea as to their relative lack of diversity. Making court-by-court data available, 
peer pressure may encourage strengthened efforts toward achieving diversity. 
This is particularly important for data related to magistrate judges because, 
unlike district judges—whose demographics are readily available from the FJC—
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no entity tracks demographic data on magistrate judges except the AO, and as 
noted above, reports the information only in the aggregate. 
No entity in the federal or state systems seeks to determine the causes of the 
lack of diversity. Rather, it appears that courts rely nearly exclusively on 
anecdotal evidence to evaluate whether efforts should be expended on achieving 
diversity goals and they tend to explain the failure to achieve parity with the 
district judge bench by citing pipeline issues. However, review of the data 
indicates that the pipeline explains the problem in only limited circumstances. 
B. Encourage Diversity Throughout the Entire Court Family 
The most diverse courts have focused not only on the diversity of the benches 
but have determined that diversity must occur throughout, including in the clerk’s 
office, in the probation office, in law clerks, and among support staff. A chief 
judge from one of these courts reported that the concept of diversity is so 
ingrained that instead of taking note when they have a diverse gathering, it is 
remarkable to them only when they don’t. Courts that have developed a culture 
of diversity invariably have a more diverse magistrate bench. 
A chief judge from a district with a culture of diversity reported that the court 
celebrates diversity by supporting minority bar associations—through the entire 
bench actively attending events hosted by these groups—and in this way, 
communicates a message that everyone is welcome in their court. By actively 
engaging with the minority and female bars, the judges meet future candidates 
for upcoming judicial vacancies and vice versa. 
The idea of knowing candidates is a common theme in the hiring process for 
magistrate judges. Most chief judges interviewed reported that though there is 
not a formal policy of selecting those they know, this is a common practice. Of 
the magistrate judges responding to the survey, nearly half clerked at some point 
before their appointment to the bench. Despite this, most courts did not explicitly 
encourage the selection of diverse law clerks. Though 53% of the chief district 
judges reported their courts encouraged judges to hire non-white and female law 
clerks, 40% indicated this encouragement was implicit only. 
Nearly 30% of Magistrate Judges worked previously as an Assistant United 
States Attorney or as an Assistant Deputy Federal Defender, but only 8% of 
AUSAs are African American, only 5% are Latino and only 38% are female.132 
Thus, part of the diversity problem is that the U.S. Attorneys’ offices consistently 
 
 132.  Debbie Mukamal & David Alan Sklansky, Op-Ed, A study of California prosecutors finds a lack 
of diversity, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2015, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0729-
sklanskymukamal-diversity-prosecutors-california-20150729-story.html [https://perma.cc/7RPS-DDYF]. 
As of January 2018, President Trump had nominated new U.S Attorneys for 58 vacancies in the federal 
districts. Of these, most were white men, three were women, and few were people of color. Jody Godoy, 
Ex-US Attorneys Say Justice Best Served by Diverse Group, LAW360 (Jan. 12, 2018, 6:12 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1001193/ex-us-attys-say-justice-best-served-by-diverse-group 
[https://perma.cc/S9KS-4REL]. 
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lack diversity and improving the diversity of these source offices can only 
improve diversity of this bench in the long term. 133 
The idea of requiring courts to select a specified number of female or non-
white judges in the manner of a quota system has been questioned for decades.134 
Several chief judges mentioned the peril of creating “the black seat” or the 
“woman seat,” when filling the benches because, once filled, there is the belief 
there is no need to consider another female or non-white for a new opening. This 
type of tokenism was a topic of a 2016 podcast, “The Lady Vanishes,” produced 
by Revisionist History.135 The podcast discusses the tragedy of “moral licensing” 
in the context of gender bias. It suggested that breaking gender and racial barriers 
does not necessarily pave the way for other women or people of color, but to the 
contrary, provides moral justification to exclude others of these demographics. 
The author posits, “You open the door to one outsider, and that gives you 
permission to close the door to others.” 
Recognizing a similar problem, famous Pittsburgh Steelers owner and one-
time chair of the NFL’s diversity committee, Dan Rooney, revolutionized how 
coaches are hired. To address the disconnect between the relatively large number 
of black players but only few black coaches, Rooney developed a requirement 
that one person of color must be interviewed for every open coaching position.136 
Other sports organizations and companies like Xerox and Facebook, have 
adopted the “Rooney Rule” in the hiring processes. 
None of the chief judges interviewed who hired diverse magistrate judges, or 
who wanted to do so, felt that quality needed to be compromised. If quality and 
demographically diverse district judges can be selected, seemingly, there is no 
need to compromise the quality of magistrate judges selected to achieve diversity. 
 
 133.  Widespread change is a long way off. Recently, The National Law Journal reported that most of 
the Justices of the United States Supreme Court make little effort to hire a diverse staff of law clerks. 
Tony Mauro, Shut Out: SCOTUS Law Clerks Still Mostly White and Male, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/nationallawjournal/2017/12/11/shut-out-scotus-law-clerks-
still-mostly-white-and-male/?slreturn=20190018214329 [https://perma.cc/97F5-J436]. During the 
Roberts’ Court, 85% of law clerks have been white. Only 20 of the 487 clerks were African American 
and only nine were Latino. Id. The Justices hired male law clerks twice as often as female law clerks 
despite that “more than half of all law students are female.” Id. The National Law Journal reported that 
in 1998, “fewer than 1.8% of the clerks hired by the then-members of the court were African-American 
(now it is 4%) and 1 percent were Hispanic (now the figure hovers at roughly 1.5%). The percentage of 
clerks who are of Asian descent has doubled from 4.5% then to nearly 9% since 2005. Then, women 
comprised one-fourth of the clerks; now they make up roughly a third.” Id. Justice Thomas placed the 
blame on the “feeder judges” who recommended white, male law clerks most often. Id. Justice Thomas 
said, “I don’t think it’s up to us to change other federal judges’ hiring practices” . . . “The reality is that 
Hispanic and blacks do not show up in any great numbers.” Id. Contrary to this assertion, 30% of Justice 
Sotomayor’s law clerks have been non-white and of the seven law clerks hired by Justice Gorsuch, three 
are non-white. Id. 
 134.  Elliot E. Slotnick, Gender, Affirmative Action, and Recruitment to the Federal Bench, 14 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 519, 526 (1984). 
 135.  The Lady Vanishes, REVISIONIST HISTORY (2016) (accessed via internet browser). 
 136.  Tom Pelissero, Rooney Rule leaves a legacy and impact far beyond NFL, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 
2017; Leigh Steinberg, Rooney Rule for NFL Minority Coaches Needs Tuning, FORBES, Jan. 19, 2017. 
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C. Standardize and Require Targeted Recruitment Efforts 
Old boy networks exclude those who are “out” and consider only those who 
are “in.” When these networks are relied upon as a primary method for recruiting 
judicial candidates, this results in a disproportionately low turnout of women and 
minority applicants because they are, in general, “out.” Though it is laudable for 
court members to encourage specific candidates to apply for open magistrate 
judge positions, unless this is done with an awareness of the goals of diversity it 
risks that the candidate pool will be increased with people of the same race, and, 
to a lesser extent, the same gender as the judge doing the encouraging.137 An all 
or nearly all white bench may be self-perpetuating regardless of the prospective 
pipeline because it communicates a message that those of diverse backgrounds 
need not apply. As astronaut Sally Ride said, “You can’t be what you can’t 
see.”138 
Consequently, targeted recruitment efforts must focus on quality candidates 
who also represent a significant demographic in the community. Outreach efforts 
need not focus only on candidates of a different race, ethnicity, and gender but 
should consider also the diversity of viewpoints which may be obtained by adding 
those of a different sexual orientation, geographical location, socio-economic 
class, or physical ability, for example. Though establishing a bench that reflects 
the community may be the goal, this should not mean search and recruitment 
efforts are restricted to the confines of the district. Especially in those districts 
where bar membership is unable to support a more diverse bench, courts should 
expand their recruitment efforts to the region, and as needed, to the entire nation. 
To do this, courts should contact specialty and minority bar groups,139 but they 
should also actively seek out specific bar members who represent a historically 
ignored group. The power behind a judge offering encouragement to a 
prospective candidate cannot be ignored. 
D. Improve the Salaries and Prestige of the Role of Magistrate Judges 
Several chief judges in districts with small populations of diverse candidates 
believed the relatively low judicial salary for federal judges was a significant 
factor that thwarted efforts toward diversity. In several districts where there is a 
small population of lawyers of color but a large population of people of color, 
 
 137.  Brian W. Collins, Note, Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices: The Plight of the Rooney 
Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 912 (2007) (“However, acknowledging that a problem exists is merely 
symptom recognition; it does not guarantee a solution. Because unconscious bias is unintentional and not 
easily recognizable, it will not disappear unless specifically addressed. Exhortation, education, and 
protest all modify our conscious beliefs while leaving the unconscious foundation largely untouched.”). 
 138.  Alison Beard, Sally Ride, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/09/sally-
ride?referral=00134 [https://perma.cc/2L9B-9K2Q] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
 139.  The effectiveness of communication with specialty and non-specialty bar associations needs 
further study. Only about seventeen percent of responding magistrate judges indicated that they learned 
of the vacant judicial position through this method.  This may be because those selected are not members 
of local bar associations for reasons including that they do not have the demographics served by the 
association or because those who learned of the position through this method were not selected for the 
position. 
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most of these lawyers were successful in finding well-paying jobs out of the area. 
Several chief judges lamented their inability to lure these diverse candidates into 
applying for the position due to the substantial pay cut these lawyers would have 
to take and the lower prestige this judicial office carries. Though the duty of 
public service carried weight when deciding to apply for a magistrate judge 
position, the chief judges believed it was not sufficient to overcome salary 
concerns.140 
Courts have no control over the salary paid to magistrate judges; this is the 
job of Congress. Courts do have control over the prestige of the office. Many 
districts limit the responsibility of their magistrate judges to routine, largely non-
substantive work, and place them in an onerous supervisor-subordinate 
relationship. It is not surprising then that there is a view in these districts that the 
magistrate judge is “not a real judge.” Even in courts where magistrate judges 
have great responsibility and are trusted and valued members of the judicial 
team, practitioners still may have a faulty perception of the position. Expecting a 
candidate to leave a high-paying, respected position for one where the judge is 
treated like a research attorney is folly. Thus, hiring quality magistrate judges and 
treating them with respect would likely go far in attracting quality diverse 
candidates. 
 
E. Track the Demographics of the Applicants 
The model application form for magistrate judge openings fails to ask 
questions about the applicant’s gender, ethnic and racial background, and sexual 
orientation. The form should be modified to request this information even if it 
permits the ability to “decline to state.” 
One third of the chief judges reported their courts have modified the 
application already. This enables them to track whether the judicial opening is 
being communicated to diverse populations and to track the success of diverse 
applicants through the selection process. As it stands, districts do not know 
whether there are insufficient diverse candidates applying for the position or 
whether these candidates are culled out by the merit selection panel. 
Nevertheless, none of the chief judges interviewed knew whether this tracking 
occurred and none expressed a belief that doing so could be helpful. Requiring 
this type of tracking by the courts or the AO at least would provide a better 
understanding of the scope of the problem. 
Failing to track this information is a disadvantage for many reasons. First, 
there may be an implicit or explicit bias at play. Even with hard data, trends are 
difficult to spot and more so when the only information available is anecdotal. 
 
 140.  Magistrate and Bankruptcy Judges are paid 92% of the salary of District Judges. Judicial 
Salaries: U.S. Magistrate Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/ 
judicial-salaries-u.s.-magistrate-judges [https://perma.cc/SE8M-HYZ4] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). The 
2017 annual salary for Magistrate Judges was $188,692. Other job perks could be emphasized during the 
recruitment period such as the opportunities for travel and training and the favorable retirement scheme. 
These “value-added” perks should be detailed in job announcements. 
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For example, most of the chief judges reported pipeline issues cause the inability 
of courts to diversify the magistrate judge bench. However, 49 districts have more 
non-white and/or female district judges than their corresponding magistrate 
judge bench, leading to the conclusion that diversity is possible. 
Second, if a quality diverse candidate is not selected, maintaining this person’s 
data would permit the court to make direct contact to encourage re-application 
when there is another opening. This type of contact would help to spread the 
word that the court really does consider and value non-white and non-male 
candidates. 
Third, failing to take note of the demographics of the applicant pool and 
employing a true colorblind system of selection ignores the historical lack of 
relative opportunities for women and people of color. No person of any race, 
ethnicity, or gender is entitled to a federal judgeship. Likewise, no one should be 
excluded from a federal judgeship due to any immutable characteristic. 
F. Diversify Merit Selection Panels 
Courts are instructed that “[t]o further efforts to achieve diversity in all 
aspects of the magistrate judge selection process, courts are strongly encouraged 
to appoint a diverse merit selection panel.”141 Further instruction could be helpful 
explaining why this is important and describing ways to help the court identify 
and select diverse panel. 
Courts should be encouraged to consult specialty, minority, and voluntary bar 
associations to identify prospective panelists and should account for efforts in 
developing a diverse panel. These panelists would likely have contacts within 
their own legal communities and may be better positioned to seek out potential 
diverse applicants. Consequently, panelists should be given the opportunity to 
encourage additional applications142 for the vacant position. 
G. Standardize the Training of Merit Selection Panels 
In general, we no longer live in a time or place where open bigotry is 
tolerated. In the place of open bigots are those who maintain justifications for 
acting in a manner that is discriminatory while maintaining a self-perception of 
fairness.143 These people act in a discriminatory manner if social norms permit.144 
Addressing these and the implicit biases held by the well-intentioned members 
of hiring panels who denounce racism and sexism, is crucial.145 
 
 141.  MAGISTRATE JUDGE SELECTION REPORT, supra note 86, at 18. 
 142.  This seems to pose no greater risk of conflict than when judges encourage specific lawyers to 
apply despite that ultimately, the judges select the new magistrate judges. If the senator’s committee can 
do this when recruiting district judge applicants, it seems to make sense to allow panelists to do this too. 
 143.  Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role of Implicit 
Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553, 554 (2005). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 554–55. 
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Courts can take steps to counter “hidden” explicit bias and implicit bias. One 
important step is to standardize the training given to merit selection panelists and 
to others involved in the selection process. Most of the panelists surveyed 
received written instruction about their roles. Many courts provide panelists the 
pamphlet issued by the Administrative Office of the Courts, “The Selection, 
Appointment and Reappointment of United States Magistrate Judges.” Though 
this document is comprehensive, it provides little guidance about selecting a 
diverse bench and no information about how to do it. It states a broad and worthy 
goal: 
The essential function of courts is to dispense justice. An important component of this 
function is the creation and maintenance of diversity in the court system. A community’s 
belief that a court dispenses justice is heightened when the court reflects the 
community’s racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. 
Following this goal, the pamphlet instructs, “The merit selection panel is 
obligated, under the Judicial Conference’s selection and appointment 
regulations, to give due consideration to all qualified applicants for a magistrate 
judge position, particularly those from underrepresented groups.” This guidance 
fails to advise the group how to achieve this goal. 
The pamphlet should be modified to explain to a greater degree why a diverse 
bench is necessary and the importance of achieving this goal. It should explain 
that diversity reinforces the court’s legitimacy in the community and provides 
other benefits, including providing a broader perspective held by the bench, 
which increases the likelihood that justice is meted out. 
The pamphlet should provide actual training on the important topics that 
impede the selection of a diverse bench, including detailed information about 
implicit and explicit bias, why it exists, and specific, concrete steps to counteract 
their effects. Courts should be provided materials, including videos, to be used 
when presenting live training to the panel. Topics should include those discussed 
in the pamphlet but should supplement that document. Providing these materials 
would tend to increase the likelihood that courts would offer live training. 
When discussing implicit bias, the materials could include standardized 
interview questions to be posed to the candidates, to reduce the possibility of bias 
seeping in. At a minimum, it should remind the panelists that questions should 
be considered carefully to ensure the information sought is helpful to a fair and 
impartial selection of the top candidates and that they don’t penalize any 
applicant. 
Not only would standardized training materials ease the way for the court, 
but it would also provide a roadmap identifying the topics on which the panelists 
should be most aware. “We all should know that diversity makes for a rich 
tapestry, and we must understand that all the threads of the tapestry are equal in 
value, no matter what their color.”146 
 
 146.  Attributed to Maya Angelou. Maya Angelou’s Words that Spoke to All Our Lives, THE ROOT, 
https://www.theroot.com/maya-angelou-s-words-that-spoke-to-all-our-lives-1790875890 
[https://perma.cc/KAJ9-VNFD] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
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H. Make Courts Account for Diversity Goals 
Leading by example, the AO and individual courts must not only “talk the 
talk,” but they must “walk the walk.” They cannot merely give the idea of 
diversity lip service; they must showcase this commitment by taking the steps they 
can to improve diversity wherever they can. Improving the hiring practices in the 
AO’s office, the Clerk’s Office, Probation, and Pretrial Services of individual 
districts, and establishing greater participation in the court’s committees by 
women and people of color, are important steps to take. As the old cliché 
reminds, actions really do speak louder than words. Anything short of a 
demonstrated commitment, and the message will not be accepted by the selectors 
and may be viewed as an invitation to thwart efforts toward diversity by keeping 
out those who are not “suited” for the job.147 
Unless courts are required to account for their efforts made toward diversity, 
those courts that are mired in the status quo will have little impetus to change. 
Currently, the goal of diversity is aspirational only though it appears diversity can 
be achieved where it is fervently desired. Because necessity is the mother of 
invention, holding courts accountable for documenting their efforts toward a 
diverse magistrate judge bench would improve the likelihood of achieving such a 
bench. Courts could be required, rather than just encouraged, to take particular 
steps, for example, advertising in specialty and minority bar journals, making 
presentations to lawyer groups whose membership advances diversity, 
accounting for the number of diverse applicants, and documenting the results of 
these applications, including why they were not selected if they were not. This 
type of reporting would provide courts a reason to become creative in their 
approach. 
Almost uniformly, chief judges believe diversity provides legitimacy for the 
judiciary locally and nationally. Because the very integrity of our system is at 
issue, we must actively seek out this legitimacy or risk communities turning 
against it. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The lack of diversity of the magistrate judge bench stems not from a lack of 
enthusiasm for the goal but from a lack of a consistent will to achieve it. Failing 
to take time to understand where the problem lies and then failing to develop a 
comprehensive approach to address the problem are the biggest impediments to 
diversity. Despite the consistent view of the chief judges that the very legitimacy 
and ongoing utility of the judiciary depends upon the perception of fairness that 
can only be achieved by encouraging the belief that the courts belong to the 
 
 147.  See Ziegert & Hanges, supra note 143, at 554 (“[O]rganizational climate is a function of what is 
rewarded, supported, and expected in the organization and sends strong signals to employees and others 
about what behavior is socially acceptable.”) (citing Benjamin Schneider Organizational Climate: 
Individual Preferences and Organizational Realities, 56 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 211 (1972)). 
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people they serve, too many courts accept, rather than challenge, the idea that 
diversity cannot be achieved. 
Conversely, many courts are so adept at advancing the cause of diversity they 
no longer even think about it. These courts should be a model for the rest. 
Individual districts should not be permitted to refuse these proven methods 
because every court belongs not to the judges who work there, but to us all. 
 
